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THE GREAT AMERICAN SMOKEOUT: HOLDING
CIGARETTE MANUFACTURERS LIABLE FOR
FAILING TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE WARNINGS
OF THE HAZARDS OF SMOKING
More than 350,000 Americans die annually from cigarette-induced illness.' Smoking
is the principal cause of many serious diseases, including lung and other cancers, heart
disease, chronic bronchitis, and emphysema. 2 Yet despite the overwhelming evidence
establishing smoking as the "largest preventable cause of death in America," cigarette
manufacturers never have been held liable for the illness, disability, and death which
result from smoking.'
The de facto immunity long enjoyed by the cigarette manufacturers, however, now
may be in jeopardy. There are numerous product liability actions currently pending
throughout the United States seeking to hold cigarette manufacturers liable for the
Margolick, Antismoking Climate Inspires Suits by the Dying, N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1985, at B1, col.
2. In 1984, Surgeon General C. Everett Koop reported that cigarette smoking was the largest
preventable cause of death in the U.S. Id.
2 Cancer: Cigarette smoking has been established as a major cause of cancer of the lung, larynx,
oral cavity, esophagus, and bladder and is significantly associated with cancer of the kidney and
pancreas. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, SMOKING AND HEALTH, REPORT OF THE
SURGEON GENERAL, ch. 5, at 31, 36, 42, 44, 49, 53 (1979) [hereinafter 1979 SURGEON GENERAL'S
REPORT]. Moreover, cigarette smokers have total cancer rates between two and four times greater
than non smokers. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, OFFICE ON SMOKING AND
HEALTH, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: CANCER - A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL
at v (1982) [hereinafter 1982 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT].
Chronic Obstructive Lung Disease (Emphysema and Chronic Bronchitis): The Surgeon General re-
ported in 1984 that "the contribution of cigarette smoking to chronic obstructive lung disease
morbidity and mortality far outweighs all other factors." OFFICE OF SMOKING AND HEALTH, U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: CHRONIC OB-
STRUCTIVE LUNG DISEASE, at i (1984). Between 70% and 80% of all emphysema and chronic
bronchitis deaths each year are smoking related. Holbrook, Tobacco Smoking in HARRISON'S PRIN-
CIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 940 (K. Isselbacher 9th ed. 1980).
Heart Disease: Smoking doubles the risk of suffering from coronary heart disease. 1979 SURGEON
GENERAL'S REPORT, supra, ch. 4 at 34-35. Moreover, an estimated 30% of all fatal heart attacks are
attributable to cigarette smoking. OFFICE OF SMOKING AND HEALTH, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING: CARDIOVASCULAR DISEASE A REPORT
OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, at (1983).
3 1979 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 2, at ii (Secretary's Forward).
Plaintiffs filed several cases throughout the 1960s but the cigarette manufacturers were
universally successful. See, e.g., Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 E2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962), question
certified on rehearing, 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla.), rev'd and remanded, 325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963), rev'd
and remanded on rehearing, 391 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1968), aff'd on rehearing en bane, 409 F.2d 1166 (5th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 911 (1970); Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964);
Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961), aff'd on rehearing, 350 F.2d
479 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966), modified, 370 F.2d 95 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 1009 (1967); Lartique v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 865 (1963). See infra notes 22-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of unsuccessful
suits against cigarette manufacturers.
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harmful effects of smoking. 6 Evolution in the field of product liability law, 6 extensive
scientific evidence linking cigarette smoking to disease, 7 and increased public sentiment
against smokings suggest that plaintiffs in these current lawsuits may recover damages
from the cigarette manufacturers for the injuries and death caused by smoking.
Under today's product liability standards, courts have held manufacturers of even
the most essential products on the market, including automobiles, 6 food items,'° and
prescription drugs," strictly liable for the injuries caused by their products. Courts apply
strict liability when the manufacturer's product is unsafe due to improper design," flaws
in the manufacturing process," or inadequate warnings.' 4 Courts premise strict liability
solely upon the defective nature of the product and may hold a manufacturer strictly
liable for the harm caused by its product even in the absence of any negligent or culpable
5 At the time of publication over 100 cases are pending throughout the country. Information
regarding these cases can be obtained from the Tobacco Products Liability Project (TPLP) do
Professor Richard Daynard, Northeastern University School of Law. TPLP serves as a clearinghouse,
referral, and consulting service for anyone interested in suing a tobacco company.
s See generally Schwartz, New Products, Old Products, Evolving Law, Retroactive Law, 58 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 796, 797-811 (1983) (illustrating development of product liability doctrine).
7
 The 1979 Surgeon General's Report, which was based on more than 30,000 articles and
scientific studies relating cigarettes to disease, concluded that the scientific evidence on the adverse
health effects of smoking is overwhelming. 1979 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 2, Preface
at vii (1979). The report stated that "cigarette smoking is the most important preventable environ-
mental factor contributing to illness, disability and death in the United States." Id. See also supra
note 2 for studies linking smoking to health problems.
8 For example, antismoking regulations which ban smoking in public places have become
increasingly prevalent in the United States. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1986, at BI, col. 6.
9 See, e.g., Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976); Carey v. General
Motors Corp., 377 Mass. 736, 387 N.E.2d 583 (1979).
L° See, e.g., Coffer v. Standard Brands Inc., 30 N.C. App. 134, 226 S.E.2d 534 (1976) (peanuts);
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 15(1 P.2d 436 (1944) (soda).
" See, e.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.) (polio vaccine), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1096 (1974); McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 270 Or. 375, 528 P.2d 522 (1974)
(oral contraceptive); Michael v. Warner/Chilcott, 91 N.M. 651, 579 P.2d 183 (N.M. Ct. App. 1976)
(sinus medication).
' 2 See generally P. Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: The Meaning of "Defect" in the Manufacture and
Design of Products, 20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 539 (1969); W. KEETON, D. OWEN & J. MONTGOMERY, CASES
AND MATERIALS IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY 364-99 (1980) [hereinafter PRODUCT LIABILITY
AND SAFETY]; 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16A[41[1]fiv] (1985) [hereinafter
FRUMER & FREEDMAN].
II See generally Weinstein, Twerski, Piehler & Donaher, Product Liability: An Interaction of Law
and Technology, 12 Duq. L. REV. 425, 430-33 (1974); Wade, On the Nature of Stria Tort Liability for
Products, 44 Miss. Li. 825, 841 (1973); Schwartz, Foreword: Understanding Products Liability, 67 CALIF.
L. REV. 435, 460-01 (1979); PRODUCT LIABILITY AND SAFETY, supra note 12, at 269-93; W. PROSSER
& W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 99, at 695-97 [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
14 See generally 2 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, § 16A[I][ivi; PRODUCT LIABILITY AND
SAFETY, supra note 12, at 294-325; Sales, The Duty to Warn and Instruct for Safe Use In Strict Tort
Liability, 13 ST. MAitv's L.J. 521 (1982); Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Pichler, The Use and Abuse
of Warnings in Product Liability — Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 495
(1976); Wade, supra note 13, at 831, 842: W. Keeton, Product Liability: Inadequacy of Information, 48
TEX. L. REV. 398 (1970); Dillard Sc Hart, Product Liability: Directions for Use and the Duty to Warn, 41
VA. L. REV. 145 (1955).
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conduct." Although it is a relatively recent advancement in the field of product liability
law, 15 strict liability has been adopted by virtually every jurisdiction in one form or
another. 17
In the context of the current surge of cigarette suits, plaintiffs argue that courts
should hold manufacturers strictly liable for failing to warn adequately of the dangers
of smoking.' Generally, to prevail on a failure to warn claim in a strict liability context,
plaintiffs must prove that the manufacturer sold its product in a "defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer." 19 The Restatement (Second) of Torts,
15 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment a (1965). The American Law Institute's
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) provides the standard for recovery under strict
liability: .
1 402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
Id. See, e.g., Laaperi v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 787 F.2d 726, 729 (1st Cir. 1986); Hayes v. Ariens,
391 Mass. 407, 410, 462 N.E.2d 273, 277 (1984).
16 Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court first advanced the rule of strict liability in
1944 in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462-68, 150 P.2d 436, 440-44
(1944) (Traynor, J., concurring). Justice Traynor asserted that "a manufacturer incurs an absolute
liability when an article that he has placed on the market, knowing that it is to be used without
inspection, proves to have a defect that causes injury to human beings." Id. at 461, 150 P.2d at 440
(citations omitted). The California Supreme Court in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products first adopted
the theory of strict liability. 59 Cai. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962). The RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A codified the rule of strict liability in 1965.
17 See I R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 4.41 (2d ed. 1974 &
Supp. 1985) [hereinafter HURSH & BAILEY] for a review of the status of strict liability in every
American jurisdiction. A handful of states, including Massachusetts, Florida, Delaware, and Georgia
have extended their warranty law to approximate § 402A strict liability. Id.
' 8 Smokers also may base their case on negligence and breach of warranty theories, although
strict liability is the most advantageous theory available to plaintiffs. Cigarette plaintiffs pursuing
recovery on a negligence theory must prove that the manufacturers knew or should have known
smoking was likely to cause harm but failed to warn of those dangers. These plaintiffs also must
show that the manufacturer's lack of due care in warning was the actual and legal cause of their
injuries. See Rossi, The Cigarette — Cancer.Problem: Plaintiff's Choice of Theories Explored, 34 S. CAL.
L. REV. 399, 402-03 (1961). In contrast, courts impose strict liability for injuries caused by a defective
product without regard to the manufacturer's fault. When adjudicating a strict liability claim, courts
focus on the defective nature of the product itself rather than the manufacturer's knowledge and
conduct. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment a. Plaintiffs pleading a claim based
on breach of warranty must show privity, reliance, and timely notice. 1 HURSH & BAILEY, supra note
17, § 3.1-3.3 at 426-34. A strict liability action, however, relieves plaintiffs of these requirements.
2 HURSH & BAILEY, supra note 17, § 4.8 at 657-59.
i9 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
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section 402A, provides that a product is unreasonably dangerous without a warning
when its dangers would not otherwise be generally known or recognized. 20 Thus, plain-
tiffs making a claim under strict liability must prove that cigarettes require adequate
warnings because the ordinary consumer does not fully appreciate the dangers of smok-
ing, and further, that any warnings provided by the cigarette manufacturers were in-
sufficient to satisfy the manufacturers' duty to warn. 21 Cigarette plaintiffs also are re-
quired to prove that the manufacturers' failure to warn adequately of the dangers of
smoking caused their injuries. 22 Finally, even if a plaintiff successfully proves that ciga-
rettes require warnings, that the warnings provided on the cigarette package were
inadequate, and that the lack of adequate warnings actually and legally caused their
injury, a court nevertheless may deny a plaintiff full recovery if it finds that he or she
assumed the risks of smoking or negligently contributed to his or her own injury. 23
Courts should hold cigarette manufacturers liable because they have failed to pro-
vide adequate warnings of the dangers of smoking. In addition, the manufacturers'
overpromotion and deceptive advertising of cigarettes has completely eviscerated any
value that the warnings they have provided may have had. Section I will discuss briefly
the first generation of cigarette suits in which plaintiffs were universally unsuccessful in
recovering against tobacco manufacturers. 24 This section will place particular emphasis
on the defenses raised and problems of proof encountered in these early cases. Section
Il will consider generally the manufacturer's duty to warn adequately of its product's
dangers." Section II also will review the affirmative defenses available to a manufacturer
in a product liability action, focusing primarily on changes in these defenses over the
past two decades. 26 Section III will examine the increased scientific evidence of the
harmful effects of cigarette smoking and the legislative responses to these medical
developments. 27 Finally, Section IV will assess the viability of a claim for damages against
the cigarette manufacturers due to their failure to warn adequately of the dangers of
cigarette smoking. 28 Based on a consideration of the merits of such a claim, this note
will conclude that courts should hold cigarette manufacturers, as producers of the most
harmful product on the market today, to the same product liability standards that other
manufacturers must satisfy. Having failed to meet those standards, courts should hold
cigarette manufacturers liable for the harms caused by their failure to warn of the
hazards of smoking.
25 Id., § 402A, comment i (a product is unreasonably dangerous if its hazards are beyond those
which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it). The Restatement (Second)
of Torts also states that "[lin order to prevent the product from being unreasonably dangerous, the
seller may be required to give directions or warnings, on the container as to its use." Id. § 402A,
comment j. See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076,1088 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974),
21 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Of TORTS § 402A comment j. See also id. comment k ("product,
properly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it
unreasonably dangerous") (emphasis in original).
22 See infra notes 116-29.
" See infra notes 130-58.
24 See infra notes 32-58 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 59-115 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 130-58 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 159-90 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 191-321 and accompanying text.
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I. FIRST GENERATION CIGARETTE SUITS: THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY EMERGES WITH DE
FACTO IMMUNITY
Damage claims against the cigarette manufacturers are not unprecedented. Between
the late 1950's and early 1970's, plaintiffs seeking recovery for cigarette-induced cancer
filed numerous unsuccessful suits against various cigarette manufacturers. 29 Plaintiffs in
these suits generally proceeded under an implied warranty theory. Under this theory, a
manufacturer warrants that its goods are of merchantable quality when it sells them."
To be merchantable, a manufacturer's goods must be reasonably fit for the ordinary
purpose for which such goods are used." Cigarette plaintiffs typically alleged that
cigarettes were not reasonably fit to smoke." Courts were reluctant, however, to allow
recovery under these circumstances because liability would have required a finding that
cigarettes are unsafe products that should be removed from the market. 33 Manufacturers
avoided liability in this first generation of cigarette suits on several grounds. In some
cases, courts did not hold cigarette manufacturers liable because there was no evidence
that the manufacturers could have foreseen the dangers of smoking. At least one court
denied recovery based upon a finding that cigarettes were reasonably fit for use and
consumption by the general public." Finally, plaintiffs did not prevail in these early
claims against cigarette manufacturers because of the practical problems of proof and
expense in litigation of these suits.
Foreseeability of harm represented a major stumbling block to plaintiffs in the first
generation of cigarette suits." As an element of their cause of action under an implied
warranty theory, cigarette plaintiffs generally were required to prove that the manufac-
turer could foresee the deleterious effects of smoking. 36 Thus, applying negligence
notions of reasonableness to plaintiffs' claims, courts refused to hold the cigarette man-
ufacturer liable for hazards which were unknowable. 37 To permit recovery, these courts
reasoned, would in effect make the cigarette manufacturer an "absolute insurer" of its
product." For example, in 1963, in Lartique v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., the United States
29 See supra note 4. Several commentators have discussed these cases. See, e.g., Garner, Cigarette
Dependency and Civil Liability: A Modest Proposal, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1423, 1425-28 (1980) [hereinafter
Garner, Cigarette Dependency]; Garner, Cigarettes and Welfare Reform, 26 EMORY L.J. 269, 297-300
(1977) [hereinafter Garner, Welfare Reform]; Wegman, Cigarettes and Health: A Legal Analysis, 51
CORNELL L. REv. 678, 697-703 (1966).
3° PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, 95, at 681; see U .C.C. 2-314.
51 PROSSER & KEETON, Supra note 13, 95, at 681.
" See, e.g., Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3, 5 (8th Cir. 1964); Lartique v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19, 22 (5th Cir. 1963); Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70, 71
(5th Cir. 1962).
" Cf. Ross, 328 F.2d at 10 (Eighth Circuit refused to hold defendant "absolutely liable as an
insurer if smoking its cigarettes caused or contributed to cause plaintiff's cancer").
s* See Green v. American Tobacco Co., 391 F.2d 97, 101-02 (5th Cir. 1968).
" See Hudson v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 427 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1970); Ross v. Philip Morris
& Co., 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964); Lartique v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 865 (1963).
36 See Hudson v. Rd . Reynolds Tobacco Co., 427 F.2d 541, In Hudson, the Fifth Circuit granted
summary judgment for the cigarette manufacturer because plaintiff failed to allege, as required by
Louisiana law, that the manufacturer could have reasonably foreseen the risk of cigarette induced
lung cancer. Id. at 541-42.
Jr
 See Lartique, 317 F.2d at 39-40.
38 See Ross, 328 F.2d at 12.
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Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the cigarette manufacturer could be
liable "only for a defective condition ... the harmful consequences of which, based on
the state of human knowledge, are foreseeable."" The jury returned a verdict for the
defendant because it could not conclude that Mr. Lartique's cancer, attributable to fifty-
five years of smoking, was reasonably foreseeable to the cigarette manufacturer,'" Simi-
larly in Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., the Eighth Circuit refused to impose liability upon
the cigarette manufacturer because the manufacturer could not have anticipated the
cancer causing propensities of cigarettes by the use of "any developed human skills or
foresight." 41 Despite recognition that Missouri had embraced the doctrine of strict lia-
bility,42 .the federal appeals court in this 1964 case nevertheless focused on the cigarette
manufacturer's reasonableness in marketing its product and the unknowability of the
hazards of smoking.45 Thus, in many of the early cigarette suits the requirement that
plaintiffs allege and prove that the cigarette manufacturer could foresee the dangers of
smoking precluded plaintiffs from recovering for their cigarette-induced illnesses."
Although plaintiffs in Green v. American Tobacco Co.45 successfully surmounted the
foreseeability hurdle at the state court level,-06 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals denied
recovery because plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that cigarettes posed a danger to the
general public.° To establish a breach of the implied warranty, Florida law required the
plaintiff to prove that cigarettes endangered an appreciable number of smokers. 48 De-
" 317 F.2d 19, 39 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 865 (1963).
40 Id. at 39-40. The judge instructed the jury
If you find that at the time Mr. Lartique's cancer started, the cigarettes manufactured by the
defendants were usable as such, and that the state of medical knowledge was then such
that the defendants could not have anticipated in the exercise of reasonable care that
their products would cause cancer, then your verdict on the issue of implied warranty,
would be in favor of the defendants.
Id. at 23 (emphasis in original).
• 328 F.2d 3, 12-14 (8th Cir. 1964).
:w Id. at 8.
4, Id. at 10- 12.
41 Although courts premised some of those decisions on strict liability, they were reluctant to
impute knowledge to the cigarette manufacturer. See Lartique, 317 F.2d at 39. But see Halphen v.
Johns-Manville Corp., 737 F.2d 462, 465-66 (5th Cir. 1984) (repudiating Lartique).
45 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962), question certified on rehearing, 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla.), rev'd and
remanded, 325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963), rev'd and remanded on rehearing, 391 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1968),
aff'd on rehearing en bane, 409 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 911 (1970).
46
 154 So. 2d at 170-01. The Supreme Court of Florida, responding to a certified question
from the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, ruled that a cigarette manufacturer's inability to
foresee the dangers of smoking was wholly irrelevant to its liability on the theory of implied warranty.
47
 391 F.2d at 101-02.
45 Id. at 102. The United States District Court Judge for the Southern District of Florida
instructed the jury that the question was one of common danger to the general public as distin-
guished from Mr. Green alone:
if these cigarettes did endanger any important number of cigarette smokers — any
responsible number — any large segment of those smokers — then it would be a
breach of the implied warranty for fitness, which is imposed upon the manufacturer
who sells the cigarettes. If they did not, there would be no breach of warranty.
Id.
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spite a jury finding that cigarette smoking caused Green's death," the Fifth Circuit
denied recovery because of a lack of evidence generally linking cigarettes to lung cancer."
Plaintiffs in the first generation of cigarette suits also faced practical problems of
proof and traditional product liability defenses.5 ' In Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco
Co.,52 for example, the plaintiff encountered evidentiary problems early in his case 55 and
later was barred from recovery based on a finding that he had assumed the risk of
smoking. 54 In this 1961 case, plaintiff alleged that the defendant cigarette manufacturer
negligently had failed to warn of the carcinogenic components of cigarette smoke and
had breached the express warranty of safety it had made in advertisements. 55 The jury
in Pritchard decided that cigarettes caused Pritchard's cancer but denied recovery based
on its conclusion that the plaintiff had assumed the risk of injury by smoking. 56 Despite
a ruling by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit that the lower court had given
the jury erroneous instructions on assumption of the risk," plaintiff did not pursue a
new trial. Voluntarily discontinuing the case, Pritchard's attorney described the problems
of proof as "insurmountable."58
In sum, plaintiffs in the first generation of cigarette suits were unsuccessful in their
attempt to hold the cigarette manufacturers liable for the cancer-causing propensities of
cigarettes for various reasons. Principally, plaintiffs were unable to prove, as most state
law required, that the dangers of cigarette smoking were foreseeable. Plaintiffs' inability
to prove that an appreciable number of smokers suffered from cigarette-induced disease,
thereby establishing a breach of warranty claim, also precluded recovery in at least one
case. Practically, the expense of litigation and the obstacles to proof in the first generation
of suits rendered a successful action against the cigarette manufacturers a virtual im-
possibility.
Green, 304 F.2d at 71-72 (jury answering written interrogatories found smoking Lucky Strike
cigarettes a proximate cause of defendant's cancer).
" 391 F.2d at 99-102. An evidentiary ruling barring plaintiff from using favorable scientific
data when cross examining the cigarette manufacturer's experts as to their opinion that there was
no causal link between cigarette smoking and lung cancer significantly influenced this decision. See
id. at 101-02.
5 ' Traditional product liability defenses include contributory negligence, assumption of the risk,
product misuse, and obvious danger. See generally Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory
Negligence, and Assumption of Risk, 25 VAND. L. REV. 93, 95-106, 119-29 (1972); Epstein, Products
Liability.' Defenses Based on Plaintiff's Conduct, UTAH L. REV. 267, 267-73 (1968).
" 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961), aff 'd on rehearing, 350 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 987 (1966), modified, 370 F.2d 95 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 10(19 (1967).
" Id. at 300. The trial court refused to admit as evidence of defendant's knowledge of the
harm, a bibliography of nearly 800 articles dealing with the harmful effects of tobacco. Id.
Adverse evidentiary rulings continue to pose a serious obstacle to plaintiffs' recovery in the
second-round of suits. See Galbraith v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 14 PROD. SAFETY & LIAR. REP.
(13NA) 25 (Dec. 23, 1985) (Surgeon General's Report inadmissible hearsay).
" Pritchard, 350 F.2d at 482.
"Pritchard, 295 F.2d 294, 296-97.
"' Pritchard, 350 F.2d at 482. On appeal, however, the Third Circuit reversed and remanded,
finding the trial court's instructions to the jury confused the defenses of contributory negligence
and assumption of the risk. Id. at 485-86.
Id.
5" Garner, Cigarette Dependency, supra note 29, at 1427.
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11. RECOVERY AGAINST MANUFACTURERS FOR FAILING TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE WARNINGS
OF PRODUCT RISKS AND DANGERS
Changes in product liability law occurring over the past two decades have lessened
significantly the problems of pleading and proving a case against a cigarette manufac-
turer." Courts today generally are willing to adapt modern tort law to an ever-changing
and complicated environment." Increasingly, failure to warn has been used in product
liability actions as a basis for liability when a product is inherently dangerous but could
be remedied, at least in part, with an adequate warning. 6 ' Today a court many find a
properly manufactured and otherwise flawless product to be "defective" under a duty
to warn theory if the manufacturer sells its product without warning adequately of the
dangers associated with its intended and foreseeable use. 62
Adequate warnings serve two principal ends. First, an adequate warning enables the
consumer to make an intelligent and well-informed decision whether to use a given
product. 62
 Second, warnings of dangers inherent to a product's use enable consumers
to safeguard themselves against the product's hazardous condition and potential injury."
In addition, satisfaction of the duty to warn usually imposes a minimal burden upon the
manufacturer. For example, manufacturers increasingly have employed package inserts
36
 Commentators universally agree that there has been a tremendous evolution in the field of
products liability law over the past two decades. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 6, at 797-811
(illustrating development of products liability doctrine); Garner, Cigarette Dependency, supra note 29,
at 1428 (highlighting courts' acceptance of consumer expectations as determinative of a product's
defectiveness).
6° See, e.g., Ellis v. International Playtex Inc., 745 F.2d 292, 306 (4th Cir. 1984) (failure to warn
of possibility of toxic shock); Keene Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 667 F.2d 1034, 1050 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (adopting "exposure" theory for asbestos); Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d
588, 610-13, 607 P.2d 924, 936-38, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 144-46 (adopting market share liability
for DES injuries), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). See generally Page, Generic Product Risks: The Case
Against Comment k and for Strict Tort Liability, 58 N.Y.C. L. REV. 853, 853
-57 (1983).
61 See, e.g., Ellis, 745 F.2d at 306; Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Co., 493 F.2d 1076, 1087-
90 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman, 388
N.E.2d 541, 545-48 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979). See generally Twerski, supra note 14, at 500-24 (identifying
pervasive use of failure to warn theory); Noel, Recent Trends in Manufacturers' Negligence as to Design,
Instructions or Warnings, 19 Sw. L.J. 43, 44 (1965).
62
 2 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, § 16A[4][f][vi]. See, e.g., Laaperi v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 787 F.2d 726, 729 (1st Cir. 1986); Hayes v. Ariens, 391 Mass. 407, 410, 462 N.E.2d 273, 277
(1984); see also PROSSER & KErrox, supra note 13, § 99 at 697 (product can be defective in a way
that makes it unreasonably dangerous by failing to warn adequately about a risk which naturally
accompanies product's design).
63
 Courts and commentators emphasize that the consumer has a right to choose whether to
subject himself or herself to identifiable product dangers. See Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399
F.2d 121, 129-30 (9th Cir. 1968) (recipient of polio vaccine entitled to make a "true choice judg-
ment" whether to be inoculated with Sabin III vaccine). See generally McClellan, Strict Liability for
Drug Induced Injuries: An Excursion Through the Maize of Products Liability, Negligence And Absolute
Liability, 25 WAYNE L. REV. 1, 32 (1978).
61
 The principal function of a warning is educational. The manufacturer designs a warning to
alert the user to the dangers and risks associated with product use and consumption so that he or
she will treat the product with proper respect and avoid the dangerous condition. Twerski, supra
note 14, at 506. See, e.g., Torsiello v. Whitehall Laboratories, 165 N.J. Super. 311, 325-26, 398
A.2d 132, 139-40 (1979) (manufacturer must apprise consumer of the side effects of aspirin);
Michael v. Warner/Chilcott, 91 N.M. 651, 655, 579 P.2d 183, 187 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978) (manufac-
turer required to warn of the dangers of sinus medication).
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to satisfy their duty to warn. Thus, courts today are willing to impose liability upon
manufactu. rers for failure to warn because of the relative ease with which the manufac-
turer can remedy a product's defect by adequately warning of that product's dangers. 65
To recover under strict liability for failure to warn, a litigant must first establish that
the manufacturer had a duty to warn. Generally a manufacturer has a duty to warn of
dangers inherent in its product's use if those dangers are not patently obvious. The
manufacturer has the further duty to ensure that its product's warnings are adequate.
A plaintiff therefore may recover if he or she can establish that the manufacturer's
warnings were inadequate to alert the consumer fully of the dangers attendant with its
product's use. Moreover, plaintiff must establish that both the manufacturer's product
and the manufacturer's failure to warn caused his or her injury. Finally, to recover under
a duty to warn theory, plaintiffs must overcome the affirmative defenses alleged by the
product's manufacturer.
A. Establishing the Duty to Warn
In the strict liability context, a manufacturer generally is under a duty to warn if
the manufacturer knows or by the use of its special knowledge should know of a potential
danger in its product's intended or foreseeable use." Courts theoretically should impute
present day knowledge to the manufacturer because a product's defective condition,
rather than its manufacturer's culpable conduct, is the central issue in the case.67 Thus,
courts would impose strict liability upon a manufacturer for failure to warn of a product's
risks if, given present day knowledge of the product's dangers, the manufacturer would
have been negligent in failing to warn."
Nonetheless, most jurisdictions consider the manufacturer's ability to foresee ;Ls
product's dangers a prerequisite to the imposition of strict liability for failure to warn.
These courts evaluate whether a manufacturer acted reasonably, in light of knowledge
available at the time the product was sold, in marketing the product without a warning. 69
Thus, courts in the majority of: jurisdictions will hold a manufacturer strictly liable for
failure to warn only if the manufacturer knows or through its expertise should know of
dangers in its product's intended or foreseeable use and fails to warn adequately of those
dangers. 7°
65 Twerski, supra note 14, at 513.
66 See, e.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096
(1974); McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 270 Or. 375, 528 P.2d 522 (1974); Michael v.
Warner/Chilcou, 91 N.M. 651, 579 P.2d 183 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978).
67 2 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, § 16A[4][f][vil See Woodill v. Parke, Davis Co. for a
discussion of the courts' split on whether a court should impute knowledge to the product manu-
facturer in a strict liability failure to warn case, 79 Ill. 2d 26, 32-33, 402 N.E.2d 194, 197 (1980).
68 See, e.g., Halphen v. Johns-Manville Corp., 737 F.2d 462, 465-66 (5th Cir. 1984); Beshada
v. Johns-Manville Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 204-09, 447 A.2d 539, 546-49 (1982).
"See, e.g., Lindsay v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 637 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 1980); Martinez v.
Dixie Carriers, Inc., 529 F.2d 457, 465 (5th Cir. 1976); Bard, 493 F.2d at 1088 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). See also Sales, supra note 14, at 524-30.
m See, e.g., Lindsay, 637 F.2d at 91-92; Mitchell v. Sky Climber, Inc., 396 Mass. 629, 631, 487
N.E.2d 1374, 1376 (1986); Seley v. G.D. Searle & Co., 67 Ohio St. 2d 192, 198-99, 423 N.E.2d
831, 837 (1981); McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 270 Or. 375, 385-407, 528 P.2d 522,
528-38 (1974).
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Courts do, however, hold the manufacturer to the skill and knowledge of an expert
in its field. 71 Accordingly, the manufacturer must keep abreast and is presumed to have
knowledge of scientific discoveries and advancements in its field of expertise. 72 Thus, if
sufficient scientific knowledge was available regarding a product's inherent dangers, a
court may hold that the manufacturer had a duty to warn.
In addition, courts consider the likelihood of injury, the potential severity of harm,
and the feasibility of providing effective warnings when assessing whether a manufac-
turer has a duty to warn. 75 Generally, a manufacturer has a duty to warn if its product's
potential hazards are great, the possibility of consumers protecting themselves absent an
adequate warning is small, and warning of those hazards does not impose an undue
burden on the manufacturer."
A manufacturer can satisfy its duty to warn only if it is timely in alerting the
consumer to dangers associated with its product's use or consumption. A manufacturer
cannot rely on others, such as the government or other manufacturers, to "sound the
hue and cry" concerning a danger in its product. 75 Further, a manufacturer cannot wait
for what it considers to be sufficient proof of a causal relationship between dangers
inherent in its product and possible harm due to the product's use before supplying a
warning appropriate to alert the consumer of potential risks. 75 The manufacturer's duty
to warn in a timely manner is illustrated by Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Co.." In
Borel, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled that the manufacturer of insulation
could be held liable for failing to warn its employees of the dangers of working with
asbestos." Affirming a jury's verdict, the court concluded that ample evidence establish-
ing the dangers of inhaling asbestos existed as early as the 1930's. 79 Fibreboard's failure
to warn its employees of the possibility of contracting asbestosis was a breach of the
manufacturer's duty to warn.
A manufacturer generally has no duty to warn against obvious or patent dangers."
The purpose of a warning is to communicate sufficient information of' a product's
hazards to afford consumers an opportunity to make an educated decision regarding
7 ' See, e.g., Tucson Indus., Inc. v. Schwartz, 108 Ariz. 464, 468, 501 P.2d 936, 940 (1972); Borel,
493 F.2d at 1089-90; Mahr v. G.D. Searle & Co., 72 111. App. 3d 540, 564, 390 N.E.2d 1214, 1231
(1979).
" See, e.g., Borel, 493 F.2d at 1089; Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 485 F.2d 132, 140-41 (3d
Cir. 1973).
" Sales, supra note 14, at 525-28.
74 See, e.g., Fiorentino v. Staley Mfg. Co., 11 Mass. App. Ct. 428, 434, 416 N.E.2d 998, 1003
(1981). See also Sales, supra note 14, at 525-28.
75 Borel, 493 F.2d at 1090.
76 See McCue v. Norwich Pharmacal Co., 453 F.2d 1033, 1035 (1st Cir. 1972); Hamilton v.
Hardy, 549 P.2d 1099, 1108 (Colo. Ct. App. 1976). Cf. Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 3d 51,
65, 507 P.2d 653, 661, 107 Cal: Rptr. 45, 53 (1973).
77 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
78 Id. at 1089-93.
79 Id. at 1092-93.
8° See, e.g., Jamieson v. Woodward & Lothrop, 101 U.S. App. D.C. 32, 37-38, 247 F.2d 23, 28-
29 (recovery denied where elastic exerciser slipped off purchaser's foot and injured eye), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 855 (1957); Zidek v. General Motors, 66 III. App. 3d 982, 985, 389 N.E.2d 509, 512 (1978)
(no duty to warn tires will skid on wet pavement when driver suddenly stops). See also RESTATEMENT
(SEconrii) OF TORTS § 402A comment j (1965) ("a seller is not required to warn with respect to
products ... when the danger, or potentiality of danger, is generally known and recognized").
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their use of the product, as well as the ability to protect themselves from its dangers. 8 '
If a product's dangers are obvious, there is no need to warn. 82
Acceptance of the principles of strict liability over the past two decades, however,
has significantly curtailed the willingness of many courts to allow obviousness of a danger
to. operate as a bar to recovery in a product liability action." Obviousness of a product's
danger, courts have held, does not relieve the manufacturer of its duty to design a
product which is safe for its intended use." Indeed, most courts will recognize the
"patent danger rule" only when convinced that a formal warning would not have been
in any way useful." Finally, a warning will not absolve the manufacturer of liability if its
product is unavoidably unsafe and of doubtful value. 86
Thus, the majority of jurisdictions regard a manufacturer's ability to foresee its
product's dangers as a prerequisite to the imposition of liability for failure to warn.
Therefore, a manufacturer has a duty to warn if it knows, or by the use of its expertise
should know, of a danger in its product's intended or foreseeable use. Generally, a
manufacturer can satisfy its duty to warn only if it is timely in alerting the consumer to
dangers associated with its product's use or consumption. Finally, although a manufac-
turer has no duty to warn of obvious dangers, obviousness does not relieve a manufac-
turer of potential liability if a formal warning would be useful.
B. Establishing the Inadequacy of Existing Warnings
Courts have not limited recovery for failure to warn to instances in which the
manufacturer failed to provide any warning at all. Liability based on a manufacturer's
failure to warn frequently arises when a manufacturer provides a warning but that
Warning is inadequate, in either form or substance. Additionally, mere compliance with
statutory requirements does not preclude liability based on the inadequacy of a product's
warning. Furthermore, a manufacturer's overpromotion and deceptive advertising prac-
tices may render a facially adequate warning inadequate. Generally, an inadequate
warning is valueless and equal to no warning at all. 87
" See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
"2 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK or LAW or TORTS § 96, at 649 (4th ed. 1971) (the manufacturer of
a knife does not have to warn consumers that the product will cut).
" Schwartz, supra note 6, at 806-10.
" See, e.g., Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 382-86, 348 N.E.2d 571, 575-77, 384
N.Y.S.2d 115, 119-21 (1976) (questioning Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950),
the leading case standing for the principle that there is no recovery for patent dangers). See also
Palmer v. Massey-Ferguson Inc., 3 Wash. App. 508, 517, 476 P.2d 713, 719 (1970) ("the manufac-
turer of the obviously defective product ought not to escape because the product was obviously a
bad one. The law ... ought to discourage misdesign rather than encouraging it in its obvious
form.").
" See, e.g., Shuput v, Heublein, Inc., 511 F.2d 1104, 1106 (10th Cir. 1975) (champagne cork);
Borel, 493 F.2d at 1093 (asbestos dust). See aLto Garner, Cigarette Dependency, supra note 29, at 1441—
42.
8° See, e.g., Strum, Ruger & Co. Inc. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 44 (Alaska 1979) (revolver), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 894 (1981). Cf Stromsodt v. Parke—Davis and Co., 257 F. Supp. 991 (D.N.D. 1966)
(combination of DPT and polio vaccines resulted in side-effects which could have been avoided had
drugs been separately administered); Tinnerholm v. Parke, Davis & Co., 411 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1969)
(same).
87 See Fidelity Trust Co. v. Wisconsin Iron & Wire Works, 145 Wis. 385, 392, 129 N.W. 615,
618 (1911); Dillard & Hart, supra note 14, at 160.
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A warning adequate in form is clear and understandable." The warning also must
be prominent. 89
 Some courts impose the further requirement that the manufacturer use
the best possible means available to inform and warn consumers of its product's dan-
gers."
In addition to the requirement of proper form, the substance of a warning also
must be adequate. An adequate warning is strenuous enough to bring home the nature
and extent of the danger of the product involved." The New Mexico Court of Appeals,
in Michael v. WarnerIChilcott, elaborated upon this concept when it observed that an
adequate warning means notice, placed on the label of a potentially dangerous product,
that is "reasonably readable, that apprises a consumer exercising reasonable care under
the circumstances of the existence and seriousness of the danger sufficient to enable the
consumer to protect himself against it . ..." 92 The court in Michael pointed out that the
warning on defendant's sinus medication stated that the drug may damage kidneys, when
in fact, the manufacturer knew that the drug will cause kidney damage if used in large
doses." Therefore the Michael court held that the sufficiency of the medication's warning
presented a question of fact for the jury and affirmed a denial of defendant's motion
for summary judgment."
A warning is adequate in substance if it is comprehensive regarding both the nature
and severity of the risks associated with a product and is calculated to apprise the
consumer of the full extent of the dangers attendant with the product's use." Illustrative
99
 See, e.g., Hubbard-Hall Chem. Co. v. Silverman, 340 F.2d 402, 405 (1st Cir. 1965) (warning
required skull and crossbones when persons of limited reading ability would use product).
99 See, e.g., Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79, 82, 85 (4th Cir. 1962) (warning in small
print on back of label that furniture polish "may be harmful if swallowed, especially by children,"
inadequate); Maize v. Atlantic Refining Co., 352 Pa. 51, 55-56, 41 A.2d 850, 852 (1945) (instructions
in small print that cleaning solvent was to be used in a well ventilated place were inadequate,
especially when the manufacturer placed the product's name, Safety-Kleen, in large letters on all
sides of the product).
9°
 See, e.g., Yarrow v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 159, 162-63 (D.S.D. 1967) (although
company had advised physicians of risk of eye complications by means of a series of product cards,
a letter, and the Physicians' Desk Reference Book, warnings were inadequate because the company
did not use its persons employed to promote and explain its drugs to keep the physicians advised
of its product's side effects); Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 288-89, 282 A.2d 206, 220 (1971)
(same).
91 See, e.g., Ellis v. International Playtex, Inc., 745 F.2d 292, 306-07 (4th Cir. 1984); Hubbard-
Hall Chemical Corp. v. Silverman, 340 F.2d 402, 404 (1st Cir. 1965); Seley, 67 Ohio St. 2d at 198,
423 N.E.2d at 837,
92
 91 N.M. 65!, 655, 579 P.2d 183, 187 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978) (warning that medication may
damage the kidneys did not apprise the consumer that drug will cause damage in large doses). See
also Torsiello v: Whitehall Laboratories, 165 N.J. Super. 311, 316, 326-27, 398 A.2d 132, 134-35,
140 (1979) (jury question whether a warning on aspirin — "If pain persists for more than ten days
... consult a physician immediately" — adequately warned of the potential for bleeding ulcers in
the long term, high dosage user).
99 Michael, 91 N.M. at 655, 579 P.2d at 187.
94 Id.
95 See, e.g., Ellis, 745 F.2d at 306-07 (tampon necessitated warning of toxic shock syndrome);
Tucson Indus., Inc. v. Schwartz, 108 Ariz. 464, 468-69, 501 P.2d 936, 940 (1972) (warning on
contact cement not sufficient to warn that product gave off fumes which might cause blindness to
people in adjoining rooms without proper ventilation); Haberly v. Reardon Co., 319 S.W.2d 859,
867 (Mo. 1958) (warning that paint is irritating to skin is not a warning against the injury to sight
if paint comes into contact with eye). See also Spruill v. Boyle-Midway Inc., 308 F.2d 79, 85 (4th Cir.
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of this stringent requirement is MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceuticals Corp.% In MacDonald,
plaintiff, after suffering a stroke, brought a failure to warn action against the manufac-
turer of birth control pills. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts ruled that
although the defendant manufacturer warned that use of the pills could cause abnormal
clotting and possible death, the jury nonetheless could have found the warning was
inadequate because it failed to mention "stroke" specifically.°T Similarly, the warning on
the aerosol deodorant in Reid v. Eckerd Drugs, Inc. was potentially inadequate for failing
to warn of the deodorant's flammability after it had been applied." Plaintiff in Reid was
severely burned when, upon striking a match to light a cigarette, the deodorant he had
applied to his body ignited. The North Carolina Court of Appeals held that the manu-
facturer's warning never to spray deodorant toward a flame was not sufficient as a matter
of law to give plaintiff adequate notice of the product's dangers." Thus, in order to be
adequate, the substance of a warning must fully communicate the product's dangers,
indicating both the scope and gravity of potential harm.
A manufacturer is not automatically immune from liability for failure to warn when
the manufacturer satisfies government warning standards.'°° Absent specific legislative
intent to occupy the field, statutory warning requirements do not change the common-
law duty to warn.'°' Thus, even if a manufacturer adopts a warning verbatim from
federal or state regulations, the warning generally does not, as a matter of law, constitute
an adequate warning. 102
 For example, courts have not hesitated to find manufacturers
of FDA-regulated prescription drugs and vaccines liable for failing to provide adequate
warnings.'" In Bristol Myers Co. v. Gonzales, the Supreme Court of Texas held the
defendant pharmaceutical manufacturer strictly liable for failure to warn of hearing loss
1962) (warning on furniture polish insufficient to warn of the product's poisonous propensities if
ingested); Rumsey v. Freeway Manor Minimax, 423 S.W.2d 387, 393 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968) (warning
on roach poison inadequate because it did not alert the consumer that there was no antidote once
the body had absorbed the poison).
" 394 Mass. 131, 475 N.E.2d 65 (1985).
97 Id. at 141, 475 N.E.2d at 71-72. See also Krug v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 143, 147-
48 (Mo. 1967) (jury could find warning of visual disturbances inadequate when loss of sight was a
potential side effect).
98
 40 N.C. App. 476, 253 S.E.2d 344, 349-50 (1979).
" Reid, 253 S.E.2d at 349-50. Similarly, a manufacturer must warn fully of a drug's side effects.
See, e.g., Crocker v. Winthrop Laboratories, 514 S.W.2d 429, 432-33 (Tex. 1974) (judicial recognition
of manufacturer's duty to warn of addiction).
IN See, e.g., Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 3d 51, 65-66, 507 P.2d 653, 661-62, 107 Cal.
Rptr. 45, 53-54 (1973); Michael, 91 N.M. at 654, 579 P.2d at 186; Rummy, 423 S.W.2d at 394.
Whether the warnings which appear on the cigarette package as mandated by the Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-40, are sufficient to satisfy the cigarette manu-
facturer's duty to warn is unclear. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181 (1986) (the
Act preempts civil suit). But see Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 633 F. Stipp. 1171 (1986) (Act does
not preempt suit). See infra notes 235-43.
111 See, e.g., Mahr v. C.D. Searle & Co., 72 IR. App. 3d 540, 561, 390 N.E.2d 1214, 1229 (1979);
Michael, 91 N.M. at 654, 579 P.2d at 186.
1 °2 Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 658 (1st Cir. 1981); Michael, 91 N.M.
at 654, 579 P.2d at 186. See also Maize v. Atlantic Refining Co., 352 Pa. 51, 56, 41 A.2d 850, 853
(1945) (liability despite satisfaction of Surgeon General's warnings).
1°3 See, e.g., Reyes, 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.) (polio vaccine), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974);
McEwen, 270 Or. 375, 528 P.2d 522 (1974) (oral contraceptive); Michael, 91 N.M. at 651, 579 P.2d
at 183 (sinus medication). See also supra note I I.
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as a potential side effect of its product.'" The court held that FDA approval of the
product's package insert did not relieve the drug manufacturer of its obligation to
communicate an adequate warning, which would include informing the consumer of the
potential of hearing loss."a
The Gonzales decision also illustrates the potential inefficiency of allowing statutory
warning requirements to dictate the standards of tort liability. In Gonzales, evidence
existed to demonstrate that the defendant, Bristol Myers, knew of the drug's side effects
long before these risks became known to the FDA officials but failed to make timely
warnings of those known dangers.w° Permitting Bristol Myers's compliance with the
FDA's warning requirements to satisfy the manufacturer's common-law duty to warn in
Gonzales implicitly would have ratified the manufacturer's culpable failure to warn of
known dangers. Thus, compliance with statutory warning requirements does not, as a
matter of law, satisfy a manufacturer's duty to warn of known product dangers. Statutes
establish minimally sufficient regulatory requirements, but the principles of product
liability law ordinarily dictate what constitutes a legally adequate warning. Consequently,
where the manufacturer knows or has reason to know of hazards in its product, that
manufacturer has a duty to warn the consumer of those hazards.
Furthermore, a manufacturer's. representationsl 07 and marketing strategies'" may
diminish the effectiveness of a product's warning so significantly as to render the warning
inadequate. For example, in Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., the mother of two young
children died of pneumonia caused by the use of defendant's product, an antibiotic that
the pharmaceutical manufacturer continued to promote heavily even after the medical
profession had recognized its propensity to cause blood disorders.'" The Supreme Court
of California in Stevens affirmed a jury verdict finding that the defendant drug manu-
facturer had "watered down" its FDA-required warning through overpromotion of its
product."° Likewise, in Tinnerholn v. Parke, Davis & Co.,'" the court found that the
manufacturer of a dangerous drug employed a "technique of ambiguity and shrewd use
of adjectives" to "gloss over facts"' 12 that would have led doctors to prescribe other, more
1O4 561 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. 1978).
LOS Id. at 804.
"w5 Id.
L" See, e.g., Maize v. Atlantic Refining Co., 352 Pa. 51, 41 A.2d 850 (1945) (product's name
Safety-Kleen — misled users as to the safety of the cleaning solvent's use); Toole v. Richardson-
Merrell Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 708-10, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398, 412-413 (1967) (manufacturer's
statements that the drug was non-toxic and remarkably free from side effects were misrepresen-
tations that constituted failure to warn).
LH See, e.g., Tinnerholm v. Parke Davis & Co., 285 F. Supp. 432, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (drug
manufacturer liable because its shrewd advertising techniques led doctors to prescribe dangerous
drug); Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 3d 51, 66-67, 507 P.2d 653, 662-63, 107 Cal. Rptr.
45, 54-55 (1973) (manufacturer liable for death because warning on its antibiotic was counteracted
by overpromotion). See also Koenig v. Muskin Corp. & W.T. Grant Co., (Pa. C., Nov. 8, 1982)
(seductive ads showing people diving into four feet deep swimming pools negated obviousness of
danger), as discussed in Warsaw, Don't Lei A Good Lawsuit Slip Away,, 72 A.B.A.J., Oct. 1, 1986, at 80–
82.
1 °9 9 Cal. 3d 51, 57-59, 507 P.2d 653, 655-56, 107 Cal. Rptr. 45, 47-48 (1973).
"° Id. at 66, 507 P.2d at 662, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 54 (defendant extensively advertised its product,
encouraged its sales persons to diminish the seriousness of the antibiotics' side-effects, and distrib-
uted several promotional "give-aways," none of which contained warnings).
"' 285 F. Supp. 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff 'd, 411 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1969).
112 Id. at 451.
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stable vaccines."' In Tinnerholn, plaintiff suffered a violent reaction to a childhood
vaccine, the alternative to which was relatively free of side-effects." 4
 The district court
in New York found the pharmaceutical manufacturer liable for the damages which its
product caused because the manufacturer's promotion had "watered down" and ren-
dered inadequate the substance of the product's warning." 5
Thus, a manufacturer may avoid liability for failing to warn of its product's dangers
only if it supplies a warning that is adequate both in form and substance. Generally, a
warning must be clear and understandable, as well as comprehensive, regarding both
the nature and severity of a product's risks, to satisfy the manufacturer's duty to warn
adequately. A manufacturer may not avoid liability, however, simply by complying with
statutory warning requirements. Furthermore, a manufacturer's representations about
its product and marketing strategies may diminish the product's warning so as to render
it inadequate.
C. Establishing Causation
In order to recover on a claim of failure to warn, plaintiff also must establish the
element of causation." 6
 Plaintiff must prove that defendant's product was both the
actual" 7
 and legal cause of his or her injuries.'" Absent a determination that plaintiff's
injuries were attributable to a defect in the manufacturer's product, the plaintiff cannot
recover." 9
Proof of causation very often represents a major obstacle to recovery in product
liability suits.' 2° At a minimum, plaintiffs must present sufficient evidence of how the
"5 1d. at 436-37, 451.
Id. at 451.
" 5 Id.
"6 1 HURSH & BAILEY, supra note 17, § 1.29.
" 7 See Klemme, The Enterprise Liability Theory of Tort, 47 U. Cow. L. Rev. 153, 163 (1976).
Professor Klemme stated:
the rule has been: no matter how tortious the defendant's conduct may have been and
no matter how long or how strongly a given loss has been considered compensable,
unless the plaintiff is able to persuade the fact finder .. that the defendant's activity
was at least one of the infinite but for" causes of his losses, the plaintiff cannot recover.
Id. (footnotes omitted and emphasis in original). See also Owen, The Highly Blameworthy Manufacturer:
Implications on Rules of Liability and Defense in Product Liability Actions, 10 IND. L. REV. 769, 777
-84
(1977).
i" Proximate cause issues generally arise when the nexus between the manufacturer's breach
of duty to market safe products and the plaintiff's injuries appears remote or tenuous, usually due
to the intervention of some force other than plaintiff or defendant. PRODUCT LIABILITY AND SAFETY,
supra note 12, at 623. See, e.g., Little v. PPG Indus., Inc., 19 Wash. App. 812, 579 P.2d 940 (1978)
(jury question whether employer's failure to warn of dangers of using a chemical without proper
ventilation after receiving several complaints from employees was a superseding cause, negating
the chemical company's liability). When a court finds an intervening factor to be so substantial that
it supersedes defendant's conduct, the intervening cause becomes the proximate cause of the injury.
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, § 44 at 311-14.
'° See, e.g., Owens v. Bourns, Inc., 766 F.2d 145 (4th Cir. 1985) (insufficient evidence to establish
that infant's blindness was caused by defendant's ventilation equipment); Gibbs v. Procter & Gamble
Mfg. Corp., 51 111. App. 2d 469, 477-79, 201 N.F..2d 473, 477-78 (1964) (insufficient evidence to
establish that detergent caused dermatitis).
l20 See e.g., Owens, 766 F.2d at 150-51 (insufficient evidence to establish that defendant's ven-
tilation equipment caused infant's blindness); In Re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp.
740, 773-99 (1984) (due to lack of conclusive epidemiological studies actual causation virtually
impossible to establish).
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injury occurred to support inferences that a defect existed in the product and that the
defect was a substantial factor in producing their harm. 121 Plaintiffs also must sufficiently
negate alternative causes of their injuries to satisfy their burden of proof. 122 Furthermore,
if the manufacturer can show that the injurious event would have occurred regardless
of the defective nature of its product, the manufacturer has severed the causal link.' 2 $
To establish causation in suits premised upon inadequate warnings and misrepre-
sentation, plaintiffs also must prove that they relied on the manufacturer's allegedly
inadequate warnings and/or misleading statements.'" Plaintiffs are aided in proving that
an inadequate warning caused their injuries by the presumption that had the manufac-
turer adequately warned of its product's hazards, plaintiff would have read the warning
and heeded it by safeguarding himself or herself from that product's hazards or by
using the product more cautiously.'" Once a court determines that the manufacturer
has breached its duty to warn, the plaintiff usually automatically has satisfied the element
of causation. 126 The manufacturer may rebut this presumption by presenting evidence
that the plaintiff would not have acted differently had it provided an adequate warn-
ing.'" Depending on the particular facts, a manufacturer can rebut the presumption by
producing evidence that the user was blind, illiterate, intoxicated, or otherwise incapa-
citated at the time of use. 128 In similar fashion, some courts hold that the plaintiff who
has not read the product's warning has broken the causal link; these courts will not
permit recovery for injuries based on a claim for failure to warn. 129
Many product liability cases boil down to a battle of the experts, essentially requiring the jury
to resolve conflicting testimony. lA FRUMER AND FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, § 12.02[1]. See, e.g.,
Thirsk v. Ethicon Inc., 687 P.2d 1315 (Colo. App. 1983) (experts testified that surgical bone wax
caused infection); Brown v. Sterling Abrasives Div. of Cleveland Quarries Co., 5 Ill. App. 2d 1, 124
N.E.2d 607 (1955) (metallurgists testified that faulty construction of the wheel, rather than the
manner it was mounted, caused wheel to break).
121 Owen, supra note 117, at 779. See e.g., Carey v. General Motors Corp., 377 Mass. 736, 739-
41, 387 N.E.2d 583, 585-86 (1979); Gibbs v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Corp., 51 Ill. App. 2d 469,
477-78, 201 N.E.2d 473, 478 (1964). See also Kerns v. Engelke, 54 Ill. App. 3d 323, 333, 369 N.E.2d
1284, 1292 (1977) (plaintiffs must prove that defendant's product was a material element in bringing
about the injurious event), rev'd in part on other grounds, 76 Ill. 2d 154, 390 N.E.2d 859 (1979).
'" See, e.g., Schwartz v. Maqcrose Lumber & Trim Co., 29 A.D.2d 781, 287 N.Y.S.2d 706, 707-
08 (1968), aff 'd , 24 N.Y.2d 856, 301 N.Y.S.2d 91 (1969). Cf Scanlon v. General Motors Corp., 65
N.J. 582, 592, 326 A.2d 673, 678 (1974) (plaintiff must negate other causes where her proof is
based on circumstantial evidence). But see Foley v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Co., 363 Pa. I, 25, 68
A.2d 517, 528-29 (1949) ("the law does not require the elimination of every possible cause of the
accident other than that on which plaintiff relies, but only such causes, if any, as fairly arise from
evidence.") (emphasis in original).
'" This is termed the but for" test. See Owen, supra note 117, at 778-79.
124 Id. at 781-82. See also Reid v. Eckerd Drugs Inc., 40 N.C. App. 476, 486, 253 S.E.2d 344,
351 (1979).
'" Jacobs v. Technical Chem. Co., 480 S.W.2d 602, 606 (Tex. 1972). See, e.g., Reyes v. Wyeth
Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1281-82 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974); Hamilton v.
Hardy, 37 Colo. App. 375, 386, 549 P.2d 1099, 1109 (1976); Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Chapman, 388
N.E.2d 541, 553-58 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979); Nissen Trampoline Co. v. Terre Harte First Nat'l Bank,
332 N.E.2d 820, 826-27 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975), rev'd on procedural grounds. 358 N.E.2d 924 (Ind.
1976); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment j ("where warning is given, the
seller may reasonably assume it will be read and heeded").
426 See Garner, Cigarette Dependency, supra note 29, at 1447-48.
127 Technical Chem. Co., 480 S.W.2d at 606.
' 28 Id.
'" See, e.g., Bean v. Ross Mfg. Co., 344 S.W.2d 18, 30 (Mo. 1961). In some jurisdictions, however,
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In sum, courts will require plaintiffs in an action based on strict liability failure to
warn to prove that defendant's product caused their harm. Plaintiffs first must establish
that the product's defective nature caused their injury. Plaintiffs also must demonstrate
that the lack of an adequate warning was a substantial factor in their use or consumption
of the product. In most jurisdictions, plaintiffs are aided by a presumption that had a
proper warning been provided, it would have been read and heeded. Nevertheless,
proof of causation very often represents a major obstacle to recovery in product liability
suits.
D. Potential Defenses to Product Liability Actions
Even if a plaintiff successfully proves that a product is in a "defective condition
unreasonably dangerous""u and that the product was the actual and legal cause of his
or her injuries, a court may nonetheless deny full recovery. There are several defenses
available to a manufacturer who has been sued for failure to warn."' The most advan-
tageous of these defenses come under the assumption of the risk and comparative
negligence doctrines.
1. Assumption of the Risk
A plaintiff who knows a product is in a dangerous condition and proceeds to use
the product in disregard of this known danger has "assumed the risk" and may not
recover for his or her resulting injuries. 12 The traditional form of assumption of the
risk relieves a manufacturer of liability for the harm its product caused when the plaintiff
actually knew''' and appreciated the risk of injury posed by the product"' but never-
plaintiffs may recover even if they have not read the product's warning. These courts have ruled
that had the warning been adequate, that is, conspicuous and comprehensive enough to alert the
user to potential dangers, the plaintiff would have read and heeded the warning. See, e.g., McEwen
v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 270 Or. 375, 407-10, 528 P.2d 522, 538-39 (1974); Spruill v. Boyle-
Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79, 86-87 (4th Cir. 1962).
I" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A.
131 These defenses include assumption of the risk, contributory negligence, product misuse,
obvious dangers and the state of the art defense. The state of the art and obvious danger defenses
are very often discussed, as in this note, in terms of a manufacturer's duty. See supra notes 67-69,
80-85, and accompanying text.
"2 2 HURSH & BAILEY, supra note 17, § 9.23. See, e.g., Moran v. Raymond Corp., 484 F.2d 1008,
1014-16 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 932 (1974); Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co,, 45 Ill. 2d
418, 426, 261 N.E.2d 305, 309-10 (1970); Heil Co. v. Grant, 534 S.W.2d 916, 920-23 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1976).
"' See Heil Co. v. Grant, 534 S.W.2d 916, 920-23 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (courts measure the
injured person's subjective knowledge of a dangerous condition). See also Rudisaile v. Hawk Aviation,
Inc., 92 N.M. 575, 577-78, 592 P.2d 175, 177-78 (1979) (fact that pilot did not make customary
preflight check was not assumption of risk that plane did not have oil in the engine). The warning
of the danger does not have to come from the supplier of the product; rather, "one who voluntarily
chooses to use a chattel with a complete realization, regardless of how ii was acquired, of the risks to
which he thus exposes himself voluntarily assumes such risks." I HURSH & BAILEY, supra note 17,
§ 2.107 (emphasis added).
111 See, e.g., Hogue v. A.B. Chance Co., 592 P.2d 973, 975 (Okla. 1978) (plaintiff did not assume
the risk of being electrocuted where he erroneously believed that aerial basket was insulated);
Haugen v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 15 Wash. App. 379, 550 P.2d 71, 74 (1976) (plaintiff
who did not wear safety goggles because he presumed his glasses would protect his eyes from dust
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theless voluntarily proceeded to encounter the risk of harm. 133 The Restatement (Second)
of Torts imposes an additional burden on the manufacturer, by requiring that plaintiff's
conduct — knowingly exposing himself or herself to a given risk — also be unreasona-
ble.' 36
 Although some courts and commentators continue to advocate the traditional
assumption of the risk defense in product liability actions,'" many jurisdictions have
adopted the Restatement approach.'"
Under the Restatement approach, courts will deny recovery only when continued use
of a product known to be defective is both voluntary and unreasonable.'" In Johnson v.
Clark Equipment Co., for example, the Oregon Supreme Court recognized that a court
must evaluate plaintiff's claim in light of the circumstances surrounding plaintiff's
decision to encounter a given risk, including the conditions which motivated that decision
and the pressures which operated on the plaintiff, as well as the probability and gravity
of potential harm.' 4° In Johnson, plaintiff's arms were crushed in a forklift accident when,
because of hectic working conditions and a lack of assistance, he attempted to fix his
cargo from within the cab rather than dismount."' Similarly, the Colorado Court of
Appeals in Culp v. Rexnord & Booth -Rouse Equipment Co., affirmed a judgment for plaintiff
holding that a general awareness of the dangers of working with heavy machinery was
insufficient as a defense to liability. 142 Plaintiff in Culp was injured when he fell into an
and wood particles did not assume the risk that the grinding disk would explode and cause injury
to his eyes). In Haugen, the appeals court approved the trial court's jury instruction, which stated:
[i]t is not enough to bar recovery ... that the plaintiff knew that there was a general
danger connected with the use of the product, but rather it must be shown that
plaintiff actually knew, appreciated, and voluntarily and unreasonably exposed himself
to the specific defect and danger which caused his injuries.
Id. at 74.
155
 See, e.g., Hogue, 592 P.2d at 975 (Okla. 1978); PROSSER Sc KEETON, supra note 13, § 68 at
490-92. See also 2 HARPER AND JAMES, TORTS 1165-67 {1956) (identifying several categories of cases
in which courts have refused to allow the assumption of the risk defense to operate because of lack
of voluntariness).
"8
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment n (1965) provides: "NI -
 the user or
consumer discovers the defect and is aware of the danger, and nevertheless proceeds unreasonably
to make use of the product and is injured by it, he is barred from recovery." Id. (emphasis in
original). See also 2 FRUMER Ft_ FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, § 16A[5][1]; Sales, Assumption of the Risk and
Misuse in Strict Tort Liability = Prelude to Comparative Fault, I I TEX. TECH. L. REV. 729, 743-44
(1980).
17 See Hagans v. Oliver Mach. Co., 576 F.2d 97, 103 (5th Cir. 1978) ("In Texas, so long as
plaintiff encountered the danger voluntarily, it matters not that under the same or similar circum-
stances, an ordinarily prudent person would have incurred the risk which plaintiff's conduct
involved.") (emphasis added); Note, Assumption of Risk and Strict Products Liability, 95 HARV. L. REV.
872, 873-75 (1982).
18 See, e.g., Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666, 684 (W. Va. 1979) (citing
decisions in which the courts have incorporated an unreasonableness requirement).
"9 Bore& 493 F.2d at 1097, 1106-08 (sufficient evidence for jury to find that asbestos worker
did not "voluntarily and unreasonably" proceed to "encounter a known danger"). See also Johnson
v. Clark Equip. Co., 274 Or. 403, 409-13, 547 P.2d 132, 138-40 {1976) (jury question whether
plaintiff's operation of forklift from outside carriage was unreasonable given hectic working con-
ditions); Devaney v. Sarno, 125 N.J. Super. 414, 418, 311 A.2d 208, 210 (1973) (jury question
whether plaintiff acted unreasonably in driving a car with a defective seat belt), aff'd, 65 N.J. 235,
323 A.2d 449 (1974).
140
 274 Or. 403, 412-13, 547 P.2d 132, 140 (1976).
' 4 ' Id. at 405-06, 415, 547 P.2d at 1'35-36, 141.
142
 38 Colo. App. 1, 2, 553 P.2d 844, 845 (1976).
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industrial cement mixer that was defective due to lack of adequate safeguards. Although
plaintiff admitted that he was aware of the dangers of working with heavy machinery
and that injury was likely if his body got caught in the machinery, the court found this
general knowledge insufficient to warrant a finding of assumption of the risk.' 43 To
establish assumption of the risk, the court stated, defendant must show that plaintiff
had actual knowledge of the specific danger posed by the defective product and unrea-
sonably proceeded to encounter that danger) ."
Some scholars have argued that the defense of assumption of the risk is theoretically
inapplicable to suits based on failure to warn.' 45 To allow this defense, they assert, is to
indulge in "circular reasoning."'" These commentators note that the duty to warn arises
only if plaintiff does not already know of the danger. Thus, they conclude, plaintiffs
logically cannot be said to have assumed a risk of which they are unaware.'" Conversely,
these scholars argue, if the plaintiff has knowledge of a product's danger from an
independent source, the manufacturer's failure to warn could not be the proximate
cause of his or her injury.'48 Accordingly, in Wright v. Carter Products, Inc., the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recognized that the assumption of the
risk defense is illogical in the failure to warn context.' 49 In Wright, the plaintiff contracted
a severe case of dermatitis because she continued to use defendant's antiperspirant that
contained an ingredient to which she was allergic.' 5° The Second Circuit found that in
light of plaintiff's long and satisfactory experience with the product and defendant's
advertisements that its product was harmless, plaintiff could not have assumed a risk
which she did not know existed.' 5 '
Thus, to avail itself of the assumption of the risk defense, a manufacturer must at
least demonstrate that plaintiff "knowingly and voluntarily proceeded to encounter a
known danger." In those jurisdictions that follow the Restatement approach, the manu-
facturer also must prove that plaintiff's assumption of the risk was unreasonable. Finally,
at least one court has held that the assumption of the risk defense is inapplicable to suits
based on a strict liability claim.
2. Comparative Negligence
Although theoretically plaintiffs' negligence is not an appropriate inquiry in a strict
liability action, 152 a growing number of courts use comparative fault principles to appor-
' 43 Id.
141 Id.
' 45 See Dillard & Hart, supra note 14, at 163; R. Keeton, Assumption of Risk is Product Liability
Cases, 22 LA. L. REv. 122, 145 (1961).
146 Dillard & Hart, supra note 14, at 163.
'" Id.
' 48 Id.
149 244 F.2d 53, 60-61 (2d Cir. 1957). See also McClanahan v. California-Spray Chem. Corp.,
194 Va. 842, 864, 75 S.F..2d 712, 725 (1953).
15° Wright, 244 F.2d at 55-56.
' 51 Id. at 60-61.
' 62 Whether courts should apply comparative negligence principles to actions based on strict
liability is one of the most controversial issues in the area of products liability. See generally Razook,
Merging Comparative Negligence, and Strict Products Liability: The Case for Judicial Innovation, 20 Am.
Bus. L.J. 511 (1983); Plant, Comparative Negligence and Strict Tort Liability, 40 LA. L. REV. 403, 404-
10 (1980); Robinson, Square Pegs (Products Liability) in Round Holes (Comparative Negligence), 52 CAL.
Sr. B.J. 16, 17-20.(1977).
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tion damages between parties on the basis of their respective faults for plaintiff's inju-
ries.'" For example, in Daly v. General Motors Corp. , 1" the decedent sustained fatal injuries
in what otherwise would have been a minor accident. The Supreme Court of California
considered decedent's negligence in driving while intoxicated and failure to use a seat
belt or lock the car door and General Motor's defective design of the doorlatch on
decedent's vehicle concurrent causes of plaintiff's husband's death. 155 The court there-
fore concluded that the lower court should have considered decedent's lack of care and
apportioned fault between the parties.
Courts in some jurisdictions also have applied comparative fault principles to elim-
inate assumption of the risk as a separate defense. 15G The Supreme Court of Florida in
Blackburn v. Doria, for example, viewed unreasonable assumption of the risk as a form
of contributory negligence. 157 As in the typical comparative negligence case, the trial
court would instruct the jury to determine, on a percentage basis, the degree to which
defendant's product and plaintiff's unreasonable assumption of the risk contributed to
plaintiff's injury.' 58 The court would then apply the state's comparative negligence rule
to apportion liability between the parties. Acceptance of comparative negligence in the
product liability setting therefore permits a finding of manufacturer liability for failure
to warn while diminishing the damage award to account for plaintiff's personal respon-
sibility.
In sum, to recover against a manufacturer based on a failure to warn claim, a
plaintiff first must establish that the manufacturer had a duty to warn of the dangers
inherent in its product's use. Next, the plaintiff must establish either that the manufac-
turer completely failed to warn of those dangers or that the warnings which the manu-
facturer did provide were inadequate to apprise the consumer fully of the product's
hazards. To recover under the failure to warn approach, plaintiff must also prove both
that the manufacturer's product caused the injury which he or she suffered and that
the manufacturer's failure to warn caused him or her to use the dangerous product.
Finally, plaintiff must surmount the affirmative defenses asserted by the manufacturer,
such as assumption of the risk and comparative negligence, to recover completely for
his or her injuries.
General acceptance of the principles of strict liability and, specifically, recognition
of a cause of action based on a manufacturer's failure to warn, significantly lessens the
obstacles facing plaintiffs seeking to recover for injuries caused by a product whose
hazards were not adequately warned against. Plaintiffs also will benefit from the relax-
153 Although some courts have held comparative negligence to be inapplicable to actions based
on strict liability, see, e.g., Lewis v. Timco, Inc., 697 F.2d 1252, 1255-56 (5th Cir. 1983); Melia v.
Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795, 802 (8th Cir. 1976), most courts have applied comparative negligence
principles to strict liability actions. See, e.g., Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 890
(Alaska 1979); Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 734-43, 575 P.2d 1162, 1167-73,
144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 385-91 (1978). See also SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, § 12.2 at 196-
200 (2d ed. 1986) (survey of which courts have applied, either legislatively or judicially, comparative
negligence and comparative fault principles to strict liability actions).
154 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978).
' 55 Id. at 730-31, 575 P.2d at 1164-65, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 382-83.
156 At least 20 states, either by statute or judicial decision, have merged assumption of the risk
with the concept of contributory negligence and thus have applied comparative principles to
diminish plaintiffs' recovery. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 156, § 9.4 at 167-173.
157 348 So. 2d 287, 292-93 (Fla. 1977).
'58 Id. at 291.
September 1986] 	 CIGARETTE MANUFACTURER LIABILITY 	 1053
ation of affirmative defenses available to the manufacturer in a strict liability action.
Consequently, the tremendous evolution in the field of product liability law greatly
improves a litigant's prospects for recovery against a manufacturer for failing to provide
adequate warnings of its product's risks.
III. SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE OF AND LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO.THE HARMFUL EFFECTS OF
CIGARETTE SMOKING
In a 1979 report, the United States Surgeon General stated that "cigarette smoking
. is the chief, single avoidable cause of death in our society and the most important
public health issue of our time." 159 Joseph Califano, former Secretary of Health, Edu-
cation and Welfare, characterized smoking as "Public Health Enemy Number One," 16°
observing that "smoking is the largest preventable cause of death in America." 16 ' Smoking is an
established cause of several types of cancer, heart disease, chronic bronchitis, and em-
physema. 152 Consequently, in addition to the evolution of strict liability in the context of
failure to warn, the ever-increasing wealth of scientific evidence relating cigarette smok-
ing to disease and health complications should aid cigarette plaintiffs.
The medical profession acknowledged cigarette smoking as dangerous in the very
early years of Anglo-American history. 165 During the first part of the twentieth century,
the medical profession began to recognize smoking as a cause of lung cancer' 64 and a
broad spectrum of other diseases. 155 Finally, in 1964, the Surgeon General concluded
that cigarette smoking was "a health hazard of sufficient importance in the United States
to warrant appropriate remedial action." 166
159 1979 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 2, at ii (Secretary's Forward) (emphasis in
original).
166 id., ch. 2 at 9.
16 ' Id. at ii (Secretary's Forward) (emphasis in original).
162 See supra note 2 for a discussion of medical research establishing smoking as a principal
cause of these illnesses. Today, at least 340,000 excess deaths per year are attributable to cigarette
smoking. 130 CoNc. REC. 511847 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1984). Cigarette smoking debilitates another
ten million persons. Id. The phenomenal number of unnecessary deaths constitutes "more than all
automobile fatalities per year, more than a hundred times all recorded deaths caused by the acquired
immunodeficiency syndrome, and more than all American fatalities in World War I, World War 11,
and Vietnam put together." Pollin, The Role of the Addictive Process as a Key Step in Causation of all
Tobacco Related Diseases, 252 J. A.M.A. 2874, 2874 (1984).
163 Garner, Welfare Reform, supra note 29, at 280 (1977) (King James I urged Englishmen to
quit smoking, for it was "[a] custome lothsome to the eye, hateful to the nose, harmful to the braine,
dangerous to the lungs.") (quoting JAMES I, A COUNTERBLASTE TO TOBACCO (London 1604), reprinted
by THREATRUM ORBIS TERRAERUM LTD. (Amsterdam) and DA CAPO PRESS (New York) (1969)).
' 64 Id. at 281 n,62. See also Doll & Hill, Lung Cancer and Other Causes of Death in Relation to
Smoking, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 1071-81 (1956).
165 See Pollin, Tobacco Addiction and Tobacco Mortality: Implications For Death Certification, 252 J.
A.M.A. 2849, 2851-52 (1984). See also Pearl, Tobacco Smoking and Longevity, 87 SCIENCE 216, 216-
17 (1938); Dorn, Tobacco Consumption and Mortality from Cancer and Other Diseases, 74 Pus. HEALTH
REP. 581 (1959).
' 66 U.S. DEPT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, SMOKING AND HEALTH, REPORT OF THE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF 'THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICES 33 (1964) [here-
inafter 1964 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT]. The Surgeon General's committee established conclu-
sively that cigarette smoking was "causally related to lung cancer in men" and also that smoking
was "the most important of the causes of chronic bronchitis in the United States, and increases the
risks of dying from chronic bronchitis and emphysema." Id. at 31.
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The Surgeon General's words led to a tremendous surge of tobacco regulatory
proposals by the states, 157
 Congress,'" and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). 169
Fearful of diverse, non-uniform and confusing regulation, the cigarette industry suc-
cessfully lobbied Congress 17u for the adoption of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act, 171
 which required that the following legend appear on the cigarette
package: "Caution: Cigarettes May Be Hazardous To Your Health." 172 In 1970, Congress
amended the labeling act, requiring the cigarette package's admonishment to read:
"Warning: The Surgeon General Has Determined That Cigarette Smoking Is Dangerous
To Your Health."' 75
 This warning remained unchanged for the next fifteen years. In
October 1984, after much debate and external pressure, Congress passed the Compre-
hensive Smoking Education Act. 174
 This act required that four rotational warnings ap-
pear on the cigarette package beginning in October, 1985.' 75
 These recently enacted
' 67 See Ill CONG. REC. 13,901 (1965) (statement of Sen. Moss).
168 H.R. REP. No. 449, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4, reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & An.
NEWS 2350, 2351.
169
 The FTC's proposed rule would have required manufacturers to place the following warn-
ings on each package of cigarettes:
a. CAUTION — CIGARETTE SMOKING IS A HEALTH HAZARD: The Sur-
geon General's Advisory Committee on Smoking and Health has found that cigarette
smoking contributes substantially to mortality from certain specific diseases and to
overall death rate; or
b. CAUTION: Cigarette Smoking is Dangerous to Health. It May Cause Death
From Cancer and Other Diseases.
29 Fed. Reg. 530, 530-31 (1964). See historical discussion in Federal Trade Commission, Staff Report
on the Cigarette Advertising Investigation, ch.4 at 2-6 (May 1981) [hereinafter 1981 FTC STAFF REPORT].
' 7° See Cigarette Labeling and Advertising: Hearings on S. 559 and S. 547 Before the Senate Committee
on Commerce, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 244-47 (1965) (statement of Bowman Gray, Chairman of the
Board for R.J. Reynolds and spokesperson for all cigarette manufacturers).
17 ' Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. $§ 1331-40).
172 Pub. L. No. 89-92, § 4, 79 Stat. 282, 283 (1965) (prior to 1970 and 1984 amendments)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1965 & Supp. V 1965-1969)). The Act also included a preemption
provision that no state law require a cautionary statement with respect to smoking and health, other
than the specified legislation, on any cigarette package. Pub. L. No. 89-92, § 5, 79 Stat 282, 283
(1965) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1334 (1964 & Supp V 1965-70)) (emphasis added).
'" Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 2, 84 Stat. 88 (1970)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1970)). The Act also barred radio and television advertising. Pub. L.
No. 91-222, § 2, 84 Stat. 89 (1970) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1970)).
'" Congress amended the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act in 1984 by the
Comprehensive Smoking Education Act, Pub. L. No. 98-74, 98 Stat. 2200 (1984) (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1331-41 (1982 & Supp. II 1984)) (Act effective October 12, 1985). The warnings man-
dated by this Act, although more specific, should have little effect on the cigarette suits currently
pending. Most plaintiffs in these suits began smoking approximately 20 years prior to imposition
of the warnings and consequently, may avail themselves of the addiction defense to respond to
cigarette manufacturer's assertions of its assumption of risk, contributory, and comparative negli-
gence. See Garner, Cigarette Dependency, supra note 29, 1431-53, for a thorough discussion of the
addiction defense.
175
 The Act requires the following rotational warnings:
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking Causes Lung Cancer, Heart Dis-
ease, Emphysema And May Complicate Pregnancy.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Quitting Smoking Now Greatly Reduces
Serious Risks to Your Health..
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warnings vary in specificity and intensity. One legend warns of the risks of contracting
lung cancer, heart disease, chronic bronchitis, and emphysema. 176 Another warning
focuses on the hazards of pre-natal smoking. 177 The remaining two legends inform the
consumer that cigarette smoke contains carbon monoxide and that quitting smoking
decreases the risks of cigarette-induced illness. 178
Since the Surgeon General's first report on Smoking and Health in 1964, a significant
amount of evidence has been amassed illustrating the existence, extent, and severity of
tobacco-related disease and addiction. The 1979 Surgeon General's report concluded
that "the scientific evidence on the health hazards of cigarette smoking is overwhelm-
ing." 179 Although the adverse health effects of smoking vary considerably in their nature
and severity among individuals,'" evidence nonetheless demonstrates that cigarette
smokers suffer from higher rates of death, 181 illness,'" and complicated pregnancies 188
than do non-smokers. Further, the medical profession has concluded that cigarette
smoking is addictive.'" Indeed, the former director of the National Institute of Drug
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking By Pregnant Woman May Result
in Fetal Injury, Premature Birth And Low Birth Weight.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Cigarette Smoke Contains Carbon Mon-
oxide.
15 U.S.C. § 1333.
176 Id. § 1333(a).
," Id.
' 78 Id. The effect which these warnings will have upon cigarette litigation is unclear. Defendants
have asserted, and some courts have agreed, that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising
Act preempts state common law tort suit. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 187
(3d Cir. 1986); Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 623 F. Supp. 1189, 1191 (E.D. Tenn. 1985).
But see Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 633 F. Supp 1171, 1179 (D. Mass. 1986). See also infra notes
235-42 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of the cases which have addressed the
preemption issue.
179 1979 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 2, at vii (Preface). A 1981 FTC report stated,
"[t]he 1979 Report, based on over 30,000 articles on smoking and health, confirms, strengthens
and extends the conclusions of the 1964 Surgeon General's Report ...." 1981 FTC STAFF REPORT,
supra note 169, ch 1 at 5.
la° 1979 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 2, at viii (Preface). The report states the health
effects of smoking depend "on the duration and frequency of smoking, on the presence or absence
of concurrent illness or other environmental exposures, and on the individual's age and sex." Id,
18 ' Id. ch.2, at 42-44. The 1979 SUrgeon General's Report concluded that "Icligarette smoking
is the single most important environmental factor contributing to premature mortality in the United
States." Id. ch.2, at 9. On average, a thirty-year-old heavy smoker (two or more packs a day)
decreases his or her life expectancy by more than eight years. Id. ch.2, at 43. Even light smokers
(1 to 9 cigarettes a day) are 20% to 45% more likely to die at a younger age than are comparable
nonsmokers. Id., ch.2, at 15-17.
182 See supra note 2 for a discussion of research conclusively linking cigarette smoking to cancer,
chronic obstructive lung disease, and coronary heart disease.
' 83 A 1980 Surgeon General's Report stated, "[c]igarette smoking is a major threat to the
outcome of pregnancy and the well being of the new born baby." 1980 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT
ON SMOKING AND WOMEN, at v (Preface). Maternal smoking increases the risks of still born births or
neonatal deaths (e.g., sudden infant death syndrome) at least 20 percent for light smokers (less
than a pack a day) and 35 percent for heavy smokers. Meyer, Jonas & Tonascia, Perinatal Events
Associated With Maternal Smoking During Pregnancy, 103 AM. J. OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 464-76 (1976).
' 84 In 1979 the National Institute on Drug Abuse (N1DA) concluded that "cigarette smoking
behavior should be considered a form of addiction, and tobacco in the form of cigarettes, an
1056	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 27:1033
Abuse, Dr. William Pollin, called tobacco a "powerfully addictive drug," citing evidence
indicating that tobacco is six times more addictive than alcohol.'"
Although cigarette manufacturers no longer claim that smoking has affirmative
health effects, they vehemently have refused to acknowledge that cigarette smoking has
any detrimental health consequences.'" Cigarette manufacturers make constant refer-
ence to the smoking "controversy" 187
 and purport to have evidence contrary to the
conclusion that cigarettes cause cancer.' 88
 The tobacco industry contends that epidemi-
ological evidence can never be relied upon to demonstrate that smoking increases one's
likelihood of developing disease.'" Yet highly regarded medical authority, including the
Surgeon General, World Health Organization, American Medical Association, American
Heart Association, American Cancer Society, American Lung Association, and members
of the insurance industry, all recognize smoking as dangerous. 14°
Tremendous advances in scientific research have established a causal connection
between smoking and various health risks. Cigarette smoking is the major cause of
numerous cancers and is responsible for between seventy and eighty percent of all
emphysema and chronic bronchitis and thirty percent of all heart attacks. These devel-
opments, as well as the tobacco industry's consistent denial of the substantial evidence
linking cigarettes to disease, will play a crucial role in the establishment of a plaintiff's
claim that the cigarette manufacturers failed to make adequate warnings of the hazards
of smoking.
IV. CIGARETTE MANUFACTURERS SHOULD BE HELD LIABLE FOR FAILING To WARN
ADEQUATELY OF THE DANGERS OF SMOKING
Courts should hold the tobacco industry, as manufacturers of the most harmful
product on the market today,'" to the same strict liability standards as any other industry
in the United States. 192
 There is a tremendous wealth of scientific evidence conclusively
addicting substance." NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON DRUG ABUSE OF THE U.S. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE,
FINAL REPORT: TECHNICAL REVIEW ON CIGARETTE SMOKING AS AN ADDICTION, at 6 (1979). The
medical profession has created a specific category for diseases and deaths caused by tobacco
dependence. Pollin, supra note 165, at 2849 (Citing WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL
CLASSIFICATION OF DISEASES (9th rev. ed. 1978) and AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAG-
NOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (3d ed. 1980) (DSM III)). The 1979
Surgeon General's Report also recognized nicotine as addictive. 1979 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT,
Supra note 2, ch. 16.
1 " Pollin, supra note 162, at 2874. Tobacco addiction is characterized by psychoactive effects,
habitual use leading to dependence, compulsive abuse, physiological, and psychological distress
upon discontinuance and a tendency to recidivism. Pollin, supra note 165, at 2850.
188 See P. TAYLOR, THE SMOKE RING: TOBACCO, MONEY, AND MULTINATIONAL POLITICS 11-14
(1984); 1981 FTC REPORT, supra note 169, ch. 1 at 158-65; N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1984, at All
(advertisement).
I" N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1984, at A11 (advertisement).
' 88 Id.
1B9
 1981 FTC REPORT, supra note 169, ch. 1 at 58-65.
' 9° N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1987, at A1, col. 1.
191
 According to the U.S. Surgeon General, smoking kills at least 350,000 Americans each year.
See supra notes 1-2.
192
 Manufacturers of virtually every other consumer product have been liable for the harm
their products have caused. See supra notes 9-11, for cases holding liable manufacturers of auto-
mobiles, foods, and drugs.
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relating cigarette smoking to cancer, heart disease, chronic bronchitis, and emphysema,'"
yet warnings to the consumer regarding these risks are virtually nonexistent. The current
state of product liability law, together with the substantial body of evidence linking
cigarettes to several serious illnesses, mandates cigarette manufacturer liability for failure
to warn adequately of the dangers of smoking.
Plaintiffs pleaded the first generation of cigarette suits in the 1960s on theories of
strict liability and implied warranty, claiming that cigarettes were unreasonably danger-
ous or not merchantable)" Not surprisingly, courts refused to hold cigarette manufac-
turers liable under these theories, for to do so would have required a finding that
cigarettes were in a defective condition and thereby not reasonably fit to smoke.'"
Liability premised on these claims would have had an extremely detrimental impact on
the entire tobacco industry. if plaintiffs had been successful under these theories, the
only alternatives available to the cigarette manufacturer would have been either to make
cigarettes safe to smoke or to withdraw them from the market — neither a very practic-
able alternative.
Courts today, however, may be willing to hold cigarette manufacturers liable for
failing to warn consumers adequately of the health risks of cigarette smoking.'" Under
a failure to warn approach, manufacturers can avoid future liability by ensuring that
cigarette warnings are adequate to satisfy current product liability standards, that is, by
providing warnings that are sufficiently conspicuous, comprehensive, specific, and in-
tense to communicate the hazardous nature of smoking.'" In fact, a package insert
similar to those commonly accompanying drugs may be sufficient to warn consumers
fully and adequately of the dangers of cigarette smoking. Additionally, the fear that the
tobacco industry cannot withstand the imposition of liability is unfounded. The holdings
of the largest cigarette manufacturers are so vast and diversified 198 that they could settle
damage claims by reorganizing their operations while continuing to produce and sell
their product. Finally, adequate warnings will preserve the individual's right to personal
autonomy in making an informed decision whether to begin or continue smoking.'"
Liability based on the cigarette manufacturers' failure to provide adequate warnings
of the deadly propensities and addictive nature of smoking now has a strong foundation
grounded in well-established legal principles. Under present strict liability standards
199 See supra note 2.
194 See supra notes 32-58 and accompanying text.
195 See Green v. American Tobacco Co., 391 F.2d at 102; Ross v. Philip Morris Sc Co., 328 F.2d
at 12.
Plaintiffs continue to be plagued by courts' unwillingness to find cigarettes unreasonably dan-
gerous. See, e.g., Roysdon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 623 F. Supp. 1189, 1191-92 (ED. Tenn.
1985).
196 Because the cost of giving an adequate warning is minimal and relatively easy — often, a
package insert is sufficient — most courts are willing to impose liability for failure to warn. See
Sales, supra note 14, at 539-43. See, e.g., Ellis v. International Playtex, Inc., 745 F.2d 292, 306-07
(4th Cir. 1984) (tampons necessitate warning of toxic shock); Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 273 Md. 538,
332 A.2d 11 (1975) (perfume requires a warning of flammability). Further, the law has recognized
a right to full disclosure of a product's dangers even if the product is unavoidably unsafe. See Davis
v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 129-30 (9th Cir. 1968).
197 See supra notes 88-99 and accompanying text.
1" For example, in June, 1985, R.J. Reynolds bought Nabisco Brands, Inc. and became "the
nation's largest consumer products concern." N.Y. Times, June 16, 1985, § 3 at F6.
19° See supra note 63.
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courts should find that the cigarette manufacturers had and continue, to have a duty to
make timely warnings of the hazards of smoking. The cigarette manufacturers failed to
fulfill this duty by waiting until 1965 for Congress to mandate a warning before providing
any information regarding the known dangers of cigarette smoking. 200 Under generally
accepted product liability standards, courts also should recognize the inadequacy of the
federal warnings that have appeared on the cigarette package since 1965. These warnings
have not been sufficiently comprehensive or intense to satisfy the manufacturer's duty
to apprise the consumer fully of the dangers of smoking."' Moreover, the manufacturer's
own marketing activities have diminished the impact of these warnings so severely as to
render them completely useless.202
Once courts find that the cigarette manufacturers have a duty to warn and that any
warnings provided by the manufacturers have been wholly inadequate, plaintiffs still
must prove that cigarettes caused their harm and that the manufacturers' failure to warn
caused them to commence or continue smoking. 2" Although causation may be difficult
for cigarette plaintiffs to establish, this obstacle is by no means insurmountable. There
is a tremendous wealth of scientific evidence which conclusively establishes that cigarette
smoking causes cancer, heart disease, chronic bronchitis, and emphysema, as well as
several other illnesses. Moreover, in virtually every jurisdiction plaintiffs will be aided
by the presumption that had an adequate warning been provided, it would have been
read and heed ed. 2"
Plaintiffs also must overcome the affirmative defenses advanced by the manufac-
turers to recover for their cigarette-induced ailments 2 05 Although the assumption of the
risk defense is theoretically available to the cigarette manufacturer, it should fail because
the manufacturers never warned against the addictive nature of smoking. 206 Furthermore,
in light of the manufacturers' extensive advertising of cigarettes and their consistent
denial of the hazards of smoking, courts probably will not find a plaintiff's decision to
smoke unreasonable, as required by those jurisdictions that have adopted the Restatement
Second definition of assumption of the risk. 207 Courts' increased acceptance of compar-
ative fault principles, however, may lead to a reduction in a plaintiff's ultimate recovery
if a jury determines that the plaintiff should be held accountable for some portion of
his or her smoking-related illness. 2"
Finally, as a matter of policy, the tobacco industry should bear the cost of illness and
death caused by cigarettes.200 Courts, therefore, should hold the cigarette manufacturer
to the same product liability standards as the manufacturer of any other consumer
product.
A. Courts Should Hold Cigarette Manufacturers to a Duty To Warn
Courts will hold a manufacturer strictly liable for failure to warn if the manufacturer
knew or should have known of a product's dangers in its intended or foreseeable use
2°0
	 infra notes 210-38 and accompanying text.
20 ' See infra notes 249-69 and accompanying text.
202 See infra notes 273-88 and accompanying text.
203 See infra notes 289-97 and accompanying text.
2" See infra notes 296-97 and accompanying text.
205 See infra notes 298-316 and accompanying text.
206 See infra notes 310-14 and accompanying text.
207 See infra notes 298-303 and accompanying text.
208 See infra notes 315-16 and accompanying text.
209 See infra notes 317-23 and accompanying text.
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and failed to warn adequately of those dangers.'" Cigarette manufacturers offer three
major arguments against courts imposing upon them a duty to warn. The manufacturers
argue that they could not foresee the dangers of smoking, that the evidence establishing
the hazards of smoking is not conclusive, and, paradoxically, that the dangers of smoking
are obvious. These arguments are both factually and legally without merit. Evidence
regarding the dangers of cigarette smoking began to accumulate at the turn of the
century. 211 Furthermore, manufacturers cannot wait for conclusive evidence regarding
a product's hazards before incurring a duty to warn; 212 therefore, the cigarette manu-
facturer had a duty to warn when the potential hazards of smoking became apparent.
Finally, although manufacturers have no duty to warn against obvious dangers, 215 the
health hazards of smoking have been far from obvious to the general public.
A sufficient wealth of studies were performed and published between the early
1900's and the 1960's to put the tobacco industry on notice of the dangers inherent to
cigarette smoking. 2 " By 1938 a substantial bibliography on the health hazards of smoking
had accumulated. 2 " By 1964, the Surgeon General had established conclusively the
causal link between cigarette smoking and lung cancer. 2 ' 6 Because the law imposes upon
a manufacturer the knowledge of an expert in its field,217 courts should presume that
the cigarette manufacturer was fully aware of the medical developments linking cigarette
smoking to debilitating disease and death.2 " Thus, it is clear that before 1965 the
cigarette manufacturers had a duty to make timely warnings of the dangers associated
with their product. Yet it was not until 1965 that the cigarette manufacturers issued any
type of warning against the hazards of smoking. 2 "
Furthermore, in most jurisdictions a manufacturer may not wait for conclusive proof
of a causal relationship before incurring a duty to alert the public to its product's risks. 220
Rather, the manufacturer must warn its product's user of potential risks of harm. 22 '
Thus the cigarette manufacturers' classic defense that scientific evidence establishing
smoking as a cause of cancer is not conclusive222 is without merit. Like the insulation
2 " See Lindsay v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 637 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 1980); Mitchell v. Sky
Climber, Inc., 396 Mass. 629, 631, 487 N.E.2d 1374, 1376 (1986); Seley v. G.D. Searle & Co., 67
Ohio St. 2d. 192, 198-99, 423 N.E.2d 831, 837 (1981); McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,
270 Or. 375, 385-407, 528 P.2d 522, 528-38 (1974).
211 See Pollin, supra note 165, at 2851-52.
212 Borel, 493 F.2d at 1090.
210
	 supra notes 80-82.
214 In 1966, the plaintiff in Pritchard offered a bibliography of nearly 800 scientific studies on
the hazards of smoking, but the court did not permit the studies into evidence. Pritchard v. Liggett
& Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292, 300-01 (3d Cir. 1961). See Wegman, supra note 22, at 679-
688 for an excellent historical perspective of the early cigarette suits.
215
	 Pearl, supra note 165, at 216-17.
216 1964 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 166, at 31. The 1964 Surgeon General's Report
also established that cigarette smoking was one of the most important causes of chronic bronchitis.
Id.
217 See supra notes 71-72.
21e
	 Borel v. Fibreboard Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1089, 1093 (5th Cir. 1973) (asbestos
manufacturer held to know of the hazards of asbestosis), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); Mahr v.
G.D. Searle & Co., 72 Ill. App. 3d 540, 564, 390 N.E.2d 1214, 1231 (1979) (oral contraceptive
manufacturer presumed to have knowledge of the risks of blood clotting).
219
	
The Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 2(2), 79 Stat.
282 (1965) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1331).
220 See supra note 72.
221 See Borel, 493 F.2d at 1090; Hamilton v. Hardy, 549 P.2d 1099, 1108 (Colo. App. 1976),
222 See TAYLOR, supra note 191, at 12.
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manufacturer in Borel who knew or should have known of the dangers associated with
asbestos as early as the 1930's, 223 the cigarette manufacturers breached their duty to
make timely warning of the dangers of cigarette smoking. While many of the hazards
of smoking were not established conclusively until the 1960's, 224 the body of scientific
knowledge that had accumulated throughout the early part of the twentieth century was
sufficient to establish tangible health risks that required warning. 225
Additionally, a manufacturer cannot rely on others to alert the consumer to dangers
inherent in its product. 226 Implicit in this rule is the understanding that once the cigarette
manufacturers had a duty to warn of the grave health hazards of smoking, they could
not wait for the federal government to enact legislation mandating a warning on ciga-
rettes. 227 Yet this appears to be precisely what the tobacco industry has done. Indeed, it
took the Surgeon General's call to action, 228 public clamor, and a Congressional mandate
to compel cigarette manufacturers to "caution" of the possible hazards of smoking. 229
Plaintiffs' burden in proving that the cigarette manufacturers breached their duty
to make timely warnings of the hazards of smoking is lessened significantly in the
minority of jurisdictions that are willing to impute knowledge of a product's dangers to
its manufacturer.2" These jurisdictions focus solely upon the product's hazardous con-
dition rather than upon any negligent conduct by its manufacturer."' Halphen v. Johns-
Manville Corp. 232 illustrates the utility of this approach. In Halphen, a strict liability action,
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit imputed to the manufacturer current knowl-
edge about the cancer causing propensities of asbestos even though those dangers were
221 Borel, 493 F.2d at 1092-93.
229 The 1964 Surgeon General's Report publicized widely the harmful effects of smoking,
particularly lung cancer. See supra note 166.
220 See 2 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, § 16A[4][f][vi]. The seller is required to warn of
a product's danger "if he has knowledge, or by the application of reasonable, developed human
skill and foresight should have knowledge, of the presence of the ingredient and the danger."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment j. See, e.g., Ezagui v. Dow Chem. Corp., 598
F.2d 727, 733 (2d. Cir. 1979) (manufacturer of dangerous children's vaccine had a duty to warn of
the product's hazards); Borel 493 F.2d at 1092-93 (insulation manufacturer had duty to test and
warn against foreseeable dangers of asbestos); Hamilton 549 P.2d at 1108-09 (manufacturer of birth
control pill incurred duty to warn of potential side effects).
226 See Borel 493 F.2d at 1090.
227 See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Co. v. Gonzales, 561 S.W.2d 801, 804 (Tex. 1978) (pharmaceutical
manufacturer held liable for failure to warn despite satisfaction of the FDA's labeling requirements).
228 THE 1964 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 166, at 33 (concluding that cigarette
smoking was a "health hazard of sufficient importance in the United States to warrant appropriate
remedial action.").
229 The 1965 Warning Act represents a political success to the tobacco industry, given the range
and severity of regulations which the states and the FTC were proposing at the time. In response
to the Surgeon General's report of 1964, most states and the FTC had begun drafting their own
tobacco regulations and warnings. Fearful of varying and diverse warning requirements, the tobacco
industry lobbied Congress for adoption of the relatively innocuous "Caution: Cigarette Smoking
May Be Hazardous to Your Health." Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-40 (1964 & Supp. V 1965-1969).
290 See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text .
23 ' See Hayes v. Ariens, 391 Mass. 407, 413, 462 N.E.2d 273, 277-78 (1984); Ryder v. Kelly
Springfield Tire Co., 91 Wash. 2d 111,  117-118, 587 P.2d 160, 163-64 (1978). See supra notes 67-
68 and accompanying text for a discussion of imputation of a product's dangers to its manufacturer.
292 737 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1984).
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unknowable at the time plaintiff was exposed. 233 The Fifth Circuit accordingly held the
defendant asbestos manufacturer strictly liable for causing plaintiff's fatal cancer. 234
in a minority of jurisdictions, courts evaluating a cigarette plaintiff's complaint
therefore would assume the current state of scientific knowledge regarding the health
hazards of smoking and then consider whether an ordinary and prudent cigarette
manufacturer would be acting reasonably in failing to warn of these dangers. 235 Ob-
viously, no reasonable manufacturer, given the overwhelming wealth of scientific evi-
dence linking cigarettes to death and disease, could avoid liability while allowing the
risks of cigarette induced illness to go unwarned. Thus, imputing knowledge of the
hazards of cigarette smoking to the manufacturer significantly aids plaintiffs' case because
courts would not require plaintiffs to prove the cigarette manufacturer had, or should
have had, knowledge of the dangers of smoking at a given time. Rather, courts will
presume that the cigarette manufacturer was fully apprised of the hazards of its product.
Finally, although there was a significant wealth of information available to the
cigarette manufacturers to confirm the health hazards of smoking, these hazards were
by no means sufficiently obvious to the ordinary consumer to obviate the cigarette
manufacturer's duty to warn. Courts consider only the most blatant dangers "open and
obvious" enough to negate the manufacturer's duty to warn. 25° Therefore, it is highly
unlikely that a court would declare the hazards of cigarette smoking obvious. Even today,
despite the accumulation of scientific evidence identifying with particularity the health
risks associated with smoking, the American public remains remarkably unaware of the
specific dangers of cigarette smoking."' Thus, while a general awareness of the dangers
of smoking exists, the American public's unfamiliarity with the specific health risks of
smoking reveals that the dangers of cigarette smoking are not and have not been
sufficiently obvious to negate the need for adequate warnings. 238
The cigarette manufacturer has a duty to warn of the foreseeable dangers of
smoking. The cigarette manufacturer cannot wait for conclusive evidence regarding the
risks of smoking before incurring a duty to warn. Nor may the manufacturer rely on
others to alert the public of the hazards of its product. Rather, the cigarette manufacturer
must inform the consumer in a timely manner of potential dangers in its product's use.
253
	 737 F.2d at 465-66. Halphen specifically repudiated Lartique v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963).
234 Id.
2" See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
2" See Borel, 493 F.2d at 1093; Trujillo v. Uniroyal Corp., 608 F.2d 815, 819 (10th Cir. 1979).
See generally Sales, supra note 14, at 575-77. See also supra notes 80-82.
257 large percentage of the population does not know what diseases are smoking related. For
example, over 30% of the public is still unaware of the relationship between smoking and heart
disease, and nearly 50% of all women do not know that smoking during pregnancy increases the
risks of stillbirth and miscarriage. 1981 FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 169, ch. 3 at 27-30. Further,
many Americans do not understand that cigarette smoking increases a person's susceptibility to a
variety of serious health problems. Specifically, approximately 40% of the population does not know
cigarette smoking causes "most" cases of lung cancer, and 30% of the population remains unaware
that emphysema is smoking related. Id. ch. 3, at 19, 31. Additionally, a significant number under-
estimate the increased risk of dying from a smoking related illness. Id. ch. 3, at 12. Finally, the
majority of the population does not consider smoking addictive. Id. ch. 3, at 90. In particular, 3
out of 5 teenagers believe smoking is "okay if they quit before it becomes a habit." Id.
2" Cf. Borel, 493 F.2d at 1093 (hazards of asbestos not sufficiently obvious to negate need for
warning).
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Thus, at a minimum, courts should hold cigarette manufacturers accountable to those
persons who began to smoke prior to 1965, when the warnings first began to appear on
the cigarette package, because the manufacturers failed to keep abreast of scientific
evidence regarding the dangers of cigarettes and to warn of the hazards of smoking in
a timely manner.
B. Courts Should Find that the Cigarette Manufacturers Provided Inadequate Warnings of the
Hazards of Smoking
Courts should not allow the cigarette manufacturers' mere compliance with the
warning requirements of the Federal Labeling Acts to immunize the tobacco industry
from liability. Applying well-established product liability doctrine, courts should find
that these Congressionally mandated warnings were and continue to be entirely inade-
quate because they have not been sufficiently comprehensive, specific, or intense to fully
apprise the consumer of the hazards of smoking. Moreover, the cigarette manufacturers
consistently have marketed and represented their product in such a fashion as to evis-
cerate the effect of these warnings. Thus, courts should hold the cigarette manufacturer
liable for failure to provide adequate warnings of the dangers of smoking.
1. Compliance With the Cigarette Label Acts
One of the first, and most difficult, obstacles facing plaintiffs in the second gener-
ation of cigarette suits is the argument that the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Adver-
tising Act (the Act) preempts suits based on the cigarette manufacturer's failure to warn
of the dangers of smoking. 239 Defendant cigarette manufacturers have asserted, some-
times successfully, 24° that the Act preempts common-law tort actions. Although courts
uniformly have agreed that Congress neither expressly preempted nor intended to
occupy the entire field of cigarette labeling and advertising with respect to smoking and
health, courts have not conclusively determined whether tort recovery contravenes the
purposes of the Act. 241 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in Cipollone v. Liggett, found
that imposition of civil liability upon the cigarette manufacturer would be in conflict
with the Act's stated purposes — to provide for uniform labeling and safeguard the
economic welfare of the tobacco industry. 242 Nevertheless, the District Court of Massa-
2" See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1390. The Act contains a preemption provision which provides that:
(a) No statement relating to smoking and health, other than the statement required
by section 1333 ... shall be required on any cigarette package.
(b) No requirement of prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed
under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the
packages of which are labeled in conformity with the [Act].
15 U.S.C. § 1334 (1982).
24 ° See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 1986); Roysdon v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 623 F. Supp. 1189, 1191 (E.D. Tenn. 1985).
241 Contrast Cipollone 789 F.2d at 187 and Roysdon, 623 F. Supp. at 1191 (imposition of common
law liability upon cigarette manufacturers would be contrary to the purposes of the labeling acts)
with Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 1171, 1179 (D. Mass. 1986) (tort suits would not
violate the purposes of the Act).
242 789 F.2d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 1986). The Act expressly stated the policy behind the warning
to be:
It is the policy of the Congress, ... to establish a comprehensive Federal program to
deal with cigarette labeling and advertising with respect to any relationship between
smoking and health, whereby —
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chusetts, less than three weeks after the Cipollone decision, in Palmer v. Liggett Group,
Inc., disagreed with the Third Circuit and found that allowing product liability suits
based on the cigarette manufacturer's failure to warn adequately of the dangers of
smoking would not frustrate the Act's objectives. 243 The district court's ruling in Palmer
is currently on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. Should
the First Circuit affirm Palmer, conflicting opinions in the First and Third Circuits
eventually may lead to a ruling by the United States Supreme Court on the preemption
question.244
Assuming that the Act does not preempt civil suit, courts should not consider
compliance with the Act sufficient to satisfy the cigarette manufacturers' duty to provide
adequate warnings of the dangers of cigarette smoking. The warnings which have
appeared on the cigarette package, when evaluated on the basis of state common-law
tort doctrine, have been wholly inadequate. Scientific knowledge of the hazards of
cigarette smoking always has been far greater than that suggested by the federally
required labels. Indeed, evidence conclusively establishing cigarette smoking as a primary
cause of lung cancer was available prior to 1965. 245 Nevertheless, Congress did not
implement legislation requiring that cigarette manufacturers disclose the cancer causing
propensities of cigarettes until 1985,246 more than two decades after the Surgeon General
and the medical community had confirmed that causal relation.
The time lag between recognition of a product's risks and congressional action is
precisely why courts are reluctant to find that a manufacturer has fulfilled its duty to
warn by the mere satisfaction of government approved warnings. 247 A manufacturer
must continue to make timely warnings of its product's risks when it becomes aware of
those risks.248 By allowing the cigarette labeling acts to define what constitutes an ade-
quate cigarette warning, Congress and the courts have provided a disincentive for the
cigarette manufacturers to test their product and make timely warnings of risks associated
with cigarette smoking. Had courts held the cigarette manufacturers to the same stan-
dards as other manufacturers, it surely would not have taken twenty years for a warning
to appear on cigarette packages that cigarettes cause lung cancer. Thus, courts should
not consider compliance with the federal labeling acts sufficient to constitute an adequate
warning of the dangers of smoking.
(1) the public may be adequately informed that cigarette smoking may be hazard-
ous to health by inclusion of a warning to that effect on each package of cigarettes;
and
(2) commerce and the national economy may be (A) protected to the maximum
extent consistent with this declared policy and (B) not impeded by diverse, nonuni-
form, and confusing labeling and advertising regulations with respect to any relation-
ship between smoking and health.
15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982).
298
	
F. Supp. 1171, 1176-79 (D. Mass. 1986).
244 A more detailed analysis of the preemption issue is beyond the scope of this note.
245 See, e.g., Doll and Hill, supra note 164, at 1071-81 (1956).
246 See supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text for the text of the warnings which began to
appear on the cigarette package in October, 1985.
247 Cf. Bristol Myers v. Gonzales, 561 S.W.2d 801, 805 (1978) (pharmaceutical manufacturer
held liable for failure to warn despite compliance with FDA warning requirements where evidence
showed that manufacturer had knowledge of product dangers not identified by FDA warning).
245 See Tinnerholm v. Parke, Davis & Co., 285 F. Supp. 432, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See also supra
notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
1064	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 27:1033
2. The Inadequacy of the Cigarette Warnings
Measured against the principles of modern tort law, the cigarette manufacturers'
warnings are woefully inadequate. The warnings required by the cigarette labeling acts
of 1965, 1970, and 1984 have been neither strenuous enough 249 to alert the consumer
to the grave dangers of cigarette smoking nor sufficient to apprise the consumer of the
full extent of the potential illness and death resulting from smoking. 25° Moreover, these
warnings have never approached the degree of comprehensiveness necessary to warn of
the whole litany of dangers accompanying cigarette smoking. 251
The 1965 warning was not sufficiently intense to apprise the consumer of the health
hazards reasonably known to the cigarette manufacturer. Congress required that the
legend "Caution: Smoking May Be Hazardous to Your Health" appear on the cigarette
package. 252 Yet by 1965, studies conclusively established cigarette smoking as a primary
cause of lung cancer. 255 The Supreme Court of New Mexico, in Michael v. Warner!Chilcott,
found a similar warning, which provided that a sinus medication may cause kidney
damage, inadequate because kidney damage was an established side-effect of the drug. 254
Like the warning in Michael, the 1965 legend warned only that cigarette smoking may
be hazardous to health,255 when in fact substantial evidence established that it was a
health hazard. The 1967 Federal Trade Commission Staff, reporting on the effectiveness
of cigarette labeling, 255 quickly recognized the inadequacy of the 1965 warnings. 257 Con-
gress, three years later, also acknowledged the inadequacy of the warning and modified
the labeling requirement to state that the Surgeon General had determined that smoking
was dangerous. 258
The warning which appeared on the cigarette package between 1970 and 1985, 259
like the 1965 warning, also was insufficient to satisfy the cigarette manufacturer's duty
249 See, e.g., Michael v. Warner/Chilcott, 91 N.M. 651, 654, 579 P.2d 183, 186 (N.M. Ct. App.
1978) (warning on sinus medication stated product may cause hearing loss when such side effects
were in fact known dangers when product was consumed in high dosages). See also supra notes 91-
94 and accompanying text.
255 See, e.g., Reid v. Eckerd Drugs, Inc., 40 N.C. App. 476, 253 S.E.2d 344, 349-50 (warning
on antiperspirant insufficient to warn of the product's flammability). See also supra notes 95-99
and accompanying text for a dicussion of adequacy of warning.
"' MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 394 Mass. 131, 139-40, 475 N.E.2d 65, 70-71
(1980) (warning on contraceptive was not sufficiently comprehensive because it did not mention
the possibility of stroke). See also Brody, Recovery Against Tobacco Companies, TRIAL 48, 49 (Nov.
1985). See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
252
 15 U.S.0 § 1333 (1964 & Supp. Y. 1965-1969).
263 1964 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 166, at 37-38. The 1964 Surgeon General's
Report concluded, among other things, that smoking is causally related to lung cancer in men and
the leading cause of chronic bronchitis in the United States and further, that smokers have a higher
death rate from coronary artery diseases than nonsmokers. Id.
254 91 N.M. 651, 655, 579 P.2d 183, 187 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978).
255
	
supra text at note 172 for the text of the 1965 warning.
256
 The Federal Cigarette and Labeling Act of 1965 required the FTC to transmit a report
annually to Congress concerning the effectiveness of cigarette labeling, current cigarette advertising
practices, and the need for any additional legislation. 15 U.S.C. § 1334(d)(2) (1964 & Supp. V.
1965-1969).
257
 Federal Trade Commission, Report to Congress, 28 ( June 20, 1967).
253
 The Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 required the following warning: "Warn-
ing: The Surgeon General Has Determined That Cigarette Smoking is Dangerous to Your Health."
15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1982 & Supp. II 1984).
259 See id.
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to provide adequate warnings of the hazards of smoking. The cigarette manufacturers
continued to make no attempt to inform the consumer that smoking is causally related
to lung cancer, a fact that the 1964 Surgeon General's Report conclusively established. 2"
In addition, the 1965 and 1970 warnings also were not sufficiently comprehensive or
specific to convey the full scope and severity of the risks associated with smoking. 261 In
MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., the Supreme judicial Court of Massachusetts
affirmed a jury's finding that the warning on an oral contraceptive was inadequate
because, although it warned of the potential of death due to abnormal clotting, it did
not specifically mention the possibility of "stroke."262 MacDonald affirmed the well-estab-
lished rule that a warning is inadequate if it is "reluctant in tone" or fails to make the
nature and severity of a product's risks reasonably comprehensible to the average con-
sumer. 262 Courts similarly should consider the vague Surgeon General's warning that
"Cigarette Smoking Is Hazardous to Your Health" inadequate because it fails to satisfy
the specificity and comprehensiveness requirements of an adequate warning. Indeed,
the warning failed to alert the consumer that smoking is causally related to cancer, heart
disease, chronic bronchitis, and emphysema and may complicate pregnancy.264 In 1964,
however, the Surgeon General's committee on Smoking and Health concluded that all
of these serious health hazards were caused by, or potentially related to, cigarette smok-
ing.266
Even the most recent cigarette warnings, first appearing in October 1985, 266 fail to
warn of the grave dangers of cigarette smoking with sufficient force. The legend, which
reads: "SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking Causes Lung Cancer, Heart
Disease, Emphysema, and May Complicate Pregnancy," 267 hardly informs consumers that
smoking nearly doubles one's risk of heart disease, that smokers are between ten and
twenty-five times more susceptible to lung cancer than are non-smokers, and that between
seventy and eighty percent of all emphysema and chronic bronchitis deaths are attrib-
utable to smoking. 2" Furthermore, the 1985 package warnings do not inform an indi-
vidual that his or her risk of premature death from cigarette-induced illness increases
up to forty-five percent if he or she smokes.269 Such startling information clearly is not
260 1964 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, see supra note 166, at 31, 37.
26 ' See cases cited in note 95 supra.
262 394 Mass. 131, 141, 475 N.E.2d 65, 71-72 (1985).
265 See, e.g., Ellis v. International Playtex, Inc., 745 F.2d 292, 306-07 (4th Cir. 1984); Sterling
Drug, Inc., v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978, 994 (8th Cir. 1969); Seley v. G.D. Searle, 67 Ohio St. 2d 192,
198, 423 N.E.2d 831, 837 (1981); McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Co., 270 Or. 375, 388, 528
P.2d 522, 529 (1974).
244 See supra note 2.
269 1964 SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 166, at 37-39.
266
 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (1982 & Supp. II 1984). See supra note 175 for text of the current
warnings.
267 15 U.S.C. §§ 1333 (1982 & Supp. II 1984).
266 1981 FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 169, ch. 1 at 11-31. A similar argument can be made
regarding the inadequacy of the current (1985) warning, which addresses the fetal health hazards
due to maternal smoking. The medical data shows that a pregnant woman who smokes increases
up to 35% the risks of spontaneous abortion, fetal, or neonatal death. See Meyer, Jonas & Tonascia,
Perinatal Events Associated with Maternal Smoking During Pregnancy, 103 Am. J. OF EPIDEMIOLOGY, 464-
76 (1976). Clearly, the Surgeon General's warning — "WARNING: Smoking By Pregnant May
Result in Fetal Injury, Premature Birth and Low Birth Weight" — does not evoke the same sense
of urgency.
265 1979 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT supra note 2, ch.2, at 15-17.
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a matter of common knowledge and the manufacturer therefore should warn of these
potential fatal consequences.
Courts also may premise cigarette manufacturer liability for failure to provide
adequate warnings of the dangers of smoking on the manufacturer's failure to employ
the most effective means available to warn of its product's risks. 27° Cigarette manufac-
turers have not used a package insert as a means of apprising the smoker of the scope
and severity of the risks associated with cigarette smoking. 27 ' While the 1985 warnings
have two significant attributes — specificity and rotation of message 272 — these advan-
tages are probably insufficient to satisfy the cigarette manufacturer's duty to warn of the
dangers of smoking by the best available means. The manufacturer's duty to warn
probably requires the use of both a package insert, to attain the degree of specificity and
intensity required, and the rotational warning scheme, to provide clarity and maintain
novelty. Warning in this manner would not impose a tremendous burden on the cigarette
manufacturer. Many other manufacturers employ both package inserts and warnings on
their product's box or bottle as a cost-efficient manner of conveying to the consumer
the potential risks inherent to their product's use.
Even if courts deem any of the congressionally mandated warnings sufficient to
satisfy the duty to warn, the cigarette manufacturers' conduct in promoting their product
have rendered these warnings inadequate. Cigarette manufacturers may be found liable
for failure to warn because they have diminished the efficacy of the Surgeon General's
warnings by representing their cigarettes to be safe, while underemphasizing the dangers
of smoking by using shrewd marketing techniques and overpromoting their product
through intense advertising. 273 Although they have discontinued advertising that "nose,
throat and accessory organs are not affected by smoking" and "a good cigarette can
cause no ills,"2" cigarette manufacturers continue to mislead the public. First, the current
warnings are attributable to the Surgeon General, not to the manufacturer itself. By
attributing the warning to the Surgeon General, the cigarette manufacturers imply that
they disagree with the content of the warning carried on the package or at least have
confidence in the safety of their product. In addition, the cigarette manufacturers'
continuous references to the "smoking controversy" 2" eviscerate, or at least significantly
mitigate the Surgeon General's warning. Finally, cigarette manufacturers consistently
270 See Yarrow v. Sterling Drug Inc., 263 F. Supp. 159, 162-63 (D.S.D. 1967) (drug manufac-
turer did not employ its "detail men" to warn of product's possible side effects), aff 'd, 408 F.2d 978
(8th Cir 1969); Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 262, 288-89, 282 A.2d 206, 220 (1971) (same).
22 Courts also may find that cigarette manufacturers have breached their duty to disseminate
warnings of their product's dangers by the same means as they promote their product's use. In
Yarrow, for example, the manufacturer of a dangerous drug was liable for not employing its detail
men to keep physicians advised of the side effects associated with the use of a particular medication.
Yarrow, 263 F. Supp. at 162-63. Courts could apply this same reasoning to hold the cigarette
manufacturer liable for failing to use advertising as a vehicle to educate the public on the risks of
smoking. Such a requirement would be similar to the fairness doctrine operating in public broad-
casting. Cf. Banzhaf v. F.C.C., 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (upheld F.C.C. ruling that required
radio and television stations which carried cigarette advertisements to devote a significant amount
of time to presenting the case against cigarette smoking), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 892 (1969).
272 1981 FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 169, ch. 5, at 31.
272
	
supra notes 107-15 and accompanying text.
274 Wegman, supra note 29, at 679-85.
276
	 TAYLOR, supra note 186, at 12 n.36 (citing The Smoking Controversy; A Perspective, A
Statement by the Tobacco Institute, December 1978).
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deny the health hazards of smoking and challenge any medical studies as "biased" and
"non-scientific." 276 By denying the deleterious and fatal effects of smoking, the tobacco
industry impliedly has represented that cigarette smoking is safe."' The industry's
position that there is no clear evidence linking cigarette smoking to disease not only
constitutes total disregard for the substantial body of evidence concluding that smoking
creates pervasive and severe health problems but also serves to negate the warning which
appears on the package. 278
Courts also may base liability for failure to warn upon the cigarette manufacturers'
use of misleading marketing techniques which enable and indeed encourage consumers
to ignore facts which would have discouraged them from smoking. 279 By the use of
thematic imagery associating smoking with "good health, youthful vigor, [and] social and
professional success," 2" cigarette advertisements attempt to divert attention away from
the health consequences of smoking. 28 ' Cigarette manufacturers also have attempted to
allay anxieties about the hazards of smoking by modifying their product. 282 Advertise-
ments promoting cigarettes which are filtered and low in tar, while cautiously avoiding
any mention of the uncertain health benefits in smoking such cigarettes, 283 may well be
designed to convey the impression that smokers can safely smoke these cigarettes. 284
Furthermore, courts should find that the tobacco industry, through its extensive
advertising, has diminished or negated any warnings which have appeared on the ciga-
rette package. 286 Cigarettes are the most heavily advertised product in America, with the
tobacco industry expending nearly 2.7 billion dollars in 1983 to promote its product. 286
The 1981 FTC Staff Report foreshadowed liability for failure to warn based on the
tobacco industry's overpromotion of cigarettes when it stated "[On contrast to the current
warning, cigarette advertisements present information about smoking in a highly effec-
276 See id. at 11-12.
277 Cf Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 714, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398, 416
(1967) (manufacturer's statements that the drug was "non-toxic" and "remarkably free from side
effects" constituted misrepresentations); Maize v. Atlantic Refining Co., 352 Pa. 51, 55-56, 41 A.2d
850, 852 (1945) (product's name, Safety-Kleen, misled user as to the safety of the cleaning solvents
use).
2" The tobacco industry's reference to the "smoking controversy" is analogous to the misleading
effect of the product's name "Safety-Kleen" in Maize, 352 Pa. at 55-56, 41 A.2d at 852.
279 See supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
2" 1981 FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 169, ch. 2, at 8.
281 Cf. Tinnerholm v. Parke, Davis & Co., 285 F. Supp 432, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (infant suffered
"catastrophic" injuries as a result of a combination vaccine, which the manufacturer had heavily
promoted despite its serious side-effects), aff'd, 411 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1969).
282 Wegman, supra note 29, at 681.
283 In 1981, the Surgeon General questioned whether smoking low tar and nicotine cigarettes
lessens the hazards of cigarette smoking and concluded that there is no safe level of cigarette
consumption. OFFICE ON SMOKING AND HEALTH, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING, THE CHANGING CIGARETTE, A REPORT OF THE SURGEON
GENERAL, at ii ( Jan 12, 1981) [hereinafter 1981 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT'.
2" Wegman, supra note 29, at 680-81.
288 Cf. Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 3d 51, 65-66, 507 P.2d 653, 661-62, 107 Cal Rptr.
45, 53-54 (1973) (pharmaceutical manufacturer's extensive use of detail men and promotional
"give-aways" without warnings of the drug's risks negated FDA warnings).
286 FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION REPORT TO CONGRESS 45 (Table 6A) ( June 1985) [hereinafter
1985 FTC REPORT]. This amount represented more than a 100% increase over 1973 expenditures
of $247.5 million. Id. at 47 (Table 7). This figure is particularly high when one considers that
cigarette manufacturers do not advertise on TV or radio.
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tive way .... It is possible that ads make it more difficult for the health warnings to be
effective and may further increase the possibility of deception." 287 Finally, through their
placement of advertisements, the cigarette companies have used their economic leverage
to pressure the media, including national weekly magazines, to self-censor and curtail
coverage of the negative health consequences of smoking. 288
In sum, the cigarette manufacturers have failed to provide timely and adequate
warnings of the hazards of smoking. Although the Federal Cigarette Labeling Acts
mandated a warning on the cigarette package, Congress did not intend these statutory
warnings to preempt state tort suits. Indeed, the warnings mandated by the federal
government have been woefully inadequate when measured by common law product
liability standards. These warnings have not been sufficiently comprehensive, specific,
or strenuous to apprise the consumer fully of the hazards of smoking. Finally, even if
the statutory warnings theoretically are adequate, the manufacturers' deceptive market-
ing techniques and overpromotion of cigarettes have diminished the effectiveness of
these warnings so severely as to render them inadequate.
C. The Causation Requirement and the Assumption of the Risk Defense Should Not Present
Insurmountable Obstacles to Plaintiffs' Recovery
Plaintiffs in the second generation of cigarette suits will encounter formidable, but
certainly not insurmountable, obstacles to recovery. These potential obstacles include
establishing causation and overcoming the assumption of the risk defense. In addition,
comparative negligence may serve to lessen plaintiffs' awards. Evolution in the field of
product liability law suggests that plaintiffs in the second generation of suits are likely
to be successful in overcoming these obstacles and recovering, at least in part, against
cigarette manufacturers.
1. Causation
Courts will hold cigarette manufacturers liable for failure to warn of the dangers of
smoking only if plaintiffs can demonstrate that cigarette smoking caused their illness
and that the defendant's failure to warn of the dangers of smoking caused them to
commence or continue smoking 2 89 Proof that cigarette smoking caused plaintiff's injury
probably will be the most difficult element to establish in the second generation of
cigarette suits. °°
Cigarette plaintiffs cannot prove causation simply by producing general evidence
regarding the adverse health risks of cigarette smoking; rather, plaintiffs must prove
287
	 FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 169, ch.2, at 2.
2" Warner, Special Report, Cigarette Advertising and Media Coverage of Smoking and Health, 312
N.E. JRNL. MED., 384 (Feb. 7, 1985). Dr. Warner asserts that the journalism profession occasionally
has allowed itself to be a part of the "conspiracy of silence" on smoking and health, influenced,
albeit indirectly, by the power of the tobacco dollar. Id, at 388.
289 See supra note 116-19 and accompanying text.
29°
 The court denied recovery to the plaintiffs in Galbraith v. R.J. Reynolds because they were
unable to prove that cigarette smoking caused his decedent's injuries. N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 1985,
at A8, col 1. The evidence at trial, however, showed that the decedent had suffered from numerous
ailments. Id. Cigarette litigation is particularly difficult because plaintiffs have smoked different
brands of cigarettes and, consequently, there might be multiple defendants. See Garner, Cigarette
Dependency, supra note 29, at 1455-59
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that defendant's cigarettes caused their specific injury. 29 ' Proof of causation will vary
with each particular claimant's occupation, 292 gender,294 family and personal health his-
tory,294 and other habits. 295 Furthermore, a given plaintiff's success in the second gen-
eration of suits may depend on the illness from which he or she suffers. For example,
causation may be easier to prove if plaintiff suffers from a disease, such as lung cancer,
that generally is accepted as cigarette-induced.
Once plaintiffs prove that cigarette smoking caused their harm, they nevertheless
must establish that the cigarette manufacturer's failure to warn caused them to commence
or continue smoking. In the majority of jurisdictions, plaintiffs will be aided by the
presumption that had a warning been provided, the plaintiff would have read and
heeded it. 296 Accordingly, most courts will presume that had the cigarette manufacturer
adequately warned of the dangers of smoking, plaintiffs would have appreciated these
risks and chosen not to smoke, or, notwithstanding addiction, quit smoking. 292
2. Assumption of the Risk
Plaintiffs in the second generation of cigarette suits also must successfully defeat the
manufacturer's allegation that plaintiffs assumed the risk of illness by smoking. Plaintiffs
are aided in surmounting the manufacturers' defense in those jurisdictions which have
adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 402A definition of assumption of the
risk.298
 Under the Restatement approach, courts would deny recovery to plaintiffs only if
the cigarette manufacturer could demonstrate that the plaintiff's decision to smoke was
unreasonable. 299 Even if plaintiff sues in a jurisdiction which has not adopted the Res-
tatement approach, cigarette manufacturers will encounter difficulty proving that plaintiff
assumed the risk. Under any definition of assumption of the risk, the manufacturer
must prove that the plaintiff appreciated and voluntarily encountered a known danger.
To overcome this defense, plaintiffs will argue that they did not appreciate fully the
292 See Wegman, supra note 29, at 707-08 for a suggested model of proof of the causal
connection between cigarette smoking and a plaintiff's lung cancer. See also supra notes 121-22
and accompanying text for the requirements of proof of causation.
292 The synergistic effect of cigarette smoking and asbestos is widely acknowledged. THE
HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING — A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 179 (1980) [hereinafter
1980 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT]. The smoker who works with asbestos is 92 times as likely to get
cancer than a nonsmoker. Id.
2" 1979 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 2, at viii. For example, a woman who smokes
while taking oral contraceptives increases her risks of heart disease. 1980 SURGEON GENERAL'S
REPORT supra note 292, at 98-101.
2" Proof, especially in the area of heart disease, might depend on whether plaintiff has a family
history of congenital heart disease. 1979 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 2, ch. 1, at t7.
298 There exists a synergistic effect of cigarette smoking combined with alcohol consumption
on the development of cancer of the esophagus. 1979 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 2,
ch. 13, at 25.
298 See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
297 See Garner, Cigarette Dependency, supra note 29, at 1447-48.
298 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment n (1965).
299 See supra notes 135-39 and accompanying text. Plaintiff also must have been competent to
assess the dangerousness of a situation. For a discussion of plaintiff's competence to assess tobacco's
hazards, see Note, Assumption of the Risk and Strict Products Liability, supra note 137, at 812-13. See
supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text for a discussion of the unreasonableness requirement
of assumption of the risk under the Restatement's definition.
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actual hazards of cigarette smoking and that the addictive nature of smoking precludes
a finding of voluntariness.
In those jurisdictions that have adopted the Restatement approach, it is unlikely that
courts will deem unreasonable plaintiff's decision to smoke. The tobacco industry uses
advertising and marketing techniques that are designed to encourage smokers to over-
look the hazards of cigarettes. 306 Typical advertisements associate cigarettes with social
success and minimize the hazards of smoking by the use of thematic imagery and catchy
slogans."' For example, the Newport brand of cigarettes pictures young people engaged
in some sort of athletic activity and uses the slogan "Alive with Pleasure."902 Furthermore,
although the cigarette manufacturers complied with the federal warning requirements
by placing the "Surgeon General's Warning" on the cigarette package, they have vehe-
mently denied that cigarettes cause illness and death to smokers."' Consequently, in
those jurisdictions that have adopted the Restatement definition of assumption of the risk,
the cigarette manufacturers will be in the untenable position of arguing that plaintiffs'
decision to smoke was unreasonable despite their consistent denial of the health hazards
of smoking. In sum, the cigarette manufacturers' promotional efforts should preclude
a determination that the plaintiff's decision to smoke was unreasonable and the assump-
tion of the risk defense should fail.
In those jurisdictions which have not adopted the Restatement approach to assumption
of the risk304 and thus do not require a showing that plaintiff acted unreasonably, the
cigarette plaintiff still can present a strong case against the assumption of the risk defense.
The assumption of the risk defense requires the cigarette manufacturer to prove that
the plaintiff had actual knowledge and appreciated the severity of the dangers of smoking
and that, despite this knowledge, he or she voluntarily began or continued to smoke."'
Moreover, assumption of the risk employs a subjective standard, which evaluates each
particular plaintiff's knowledge regarding a product's dangers." 6 Thus, while a plaintiff
can be said to have assumed the risk of some abstract "health hazard,"" the manufac-
turer nonetheless must bear the burden of proving that plaintiff knowingly assumed the
risk of the specific dangers of smoking, that is, of contracting lung cancer, heart disease,
or the cigarette-induced ailment from which plaintiff suffers or suffered."' Because a
significant percentage of the population does not appreciate fully the possibility and
3G° See 1981 FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 169, ch. 2, at 2.
3°1 Id.
302 1985 FTC REPORT, supra note 286, at II.
3" See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
30'' See supra note 137.
300 See supra notes 132-38 and accompanying text.
508 Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 111. 2d 418, 430-31, 261 N.E.2d 305, 312 (1970). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496d comment i (1965) (courts apply a subjective standard to
assumption of the risk in determining "what the particular plaintiff sees, knows, understands and
appreciates"). See also supra note 135 for cases illustrating the subjeCtive standard applied to as-
sumption of the risk.
307 For instance, the warning provided by cigarette packages between 1970 and 1985 warned
only that cigarette smoking is dangerous, without more specifc warnings. See 15 U.S.0 § 1333
(1970).
5°8 To be barred from recovery plaintiffs must knowingly assume and appreciate a product's
risk. See, e.g., Hogue v. A.B. Chance Co., 592 P.2d 973, 975 (Okla. 1978); Haugen v. Minnesota
Mining & Mfg. Co., 15 Wash. App. 379, 550 P.2d 71, 74 (1976).
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severity of the risks attendant to cigarette smoking, 309 defendant manufacturers are likely
to encounter great difficulty proving that plaintiff assumed the specific risks of smoking.
The assumption of risk defense also should fail because tobacco addiction effectively
negates the voluntary nature of cigarette smoking. 31 ° Under both the Restatement ap-
proach and the traditional version of assumption of the risk doctrine, defendant must
show that the cigarette plaintiff knowingly and voluntarily assumed the health hazards
of smoking.'" If plaintiff began to smoke before the warnings appeared on the cigarettes,
or if plaintiff can prove lack of actual knowledge"' of the deleterious effects of cigarette
smoking, including its addictive nature, 313 the plaintiff cannot be said to have voluntarily
assumed the risk by choosing to smoke. Even if a smoker becomes fully apprised of the
dangers of smoking, the addictive nature of cigarette smoking should render this sub-
sequent knowledge irrelevant. 3 k 4 Smoking becomes involuntary to the smoker who is
addicted. Thus, the assumption of the risk defense should fail because the addictive
nature of smoking precludes a finding that the plaintiff voluntarily continued to smoke.
Nevertheless, some jurisdictions characterize assumption of the risk as a type of
contributory negligence and then apply comparative fault principles to diminish the
ultimate damage award in proportion to plaintiff's own lack of concern for his or her
safety.313 Application of comparative fault principles in the second generation of cigarette
suits will permit courts to find the cigarette manufacturer liable for failing to warn of
the deleterious effects of cigarette smoking, while allocating to the smoker individual
responsibility in the decision to commence or continue smoking."° Courts would appor-
tion damages according to the jury's determination of the parties' relative responsibility
for the smoker's illness. Thus, plaintiff's own disregard for the risks of smoking would
reduce the damages attributable to the cigarette manufacturer for failing to warn of
those dangers.
Plaintiffs face two significant obstacles in the second generation of cigarette suits;
establishing causation and overcoming the assumption of the risk defense. Although
causation represents a formidable obstacle, it is by no means impossible to establish.
First, there is a significant wealth of information available regarding the health conse-
3°9 See supra note 237.
510 Professor Donald Garner, a noted authority on tobacco litigation, first advanced the addiction
theory of recovery in his seminal article: Cigarette Dependency and Civil Liability: A Modest Proposal,
53 S. CAL- L. REV. 1423 (1980).
5 " See supra notes 134-35. As early as 1965, Justice Traynor recognized the legal significance
of tobacco addiction: "Given the habit forming nature of cigarettes, it is questionable how voluntary
many consumers are continuing to smoke." Traynor, The Ways and Means of Defective Products and
Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363, 371 (1965) (cited in Garner, Cigarette Dependency, supra note
29, at 1449).
512 See, e.g., Heil Co v. Grant, 534 S.W.2d 916, 920-21 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
5 " Despite the medical profession's conclusion that cigarette smoking is addictive, see supra notes
189-90, the majority of the population does not believe smoking to be addictive. 1981 FTC STAFF
REPORT, supra note 169, ch. 3, at 40.
414 See Garner, Cigarette Dependency, supra note 29, at 1441. Professor Garner argues, "the courts
should recognize that once a smoker is addicted, any subsequent information he receives on the
dangers of smoking is largely irrelevant." Id. Further, among those who quit, the recidivism rate is
between 60% and 70% within the first six months. Id. at 1441 n.131 (citing Berg, The High Cost of .
Self-Deception, 5 PREvENTATIvE MED. 483, 483 (1976)).
5 ' 5 See supra note 153.
316 See supra notes 153-58.
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quences of smoking. Furthermore, plaintiffs are aided by a presumption that had an
adequate warning been provided, plaintiff would have read and heeded it.
Second-generation cigarette plaintiffs also should be able to defeat the manufactur-
er's defense of assumption of the risk. The general public's lack of specific knowledge
regarding the health hazards of smoking, the addictive nature of smoking, and the
cigarette manufacturers' advertising and marketing activities all render unlikely a finding
that plaintiff assumed the risks of smoking. Nevertheless, some courts, by applying their
comparative fault rules may permit plaintiff's own disregard for the dangers of cigarette
smoking to reduce the plaintiff's ultimate recovery.
D. Policy Justifications Support Cigarette Manufacturer Liability
Several public policy goals support courts' imposition upon cigarette manufacturers
of strict liability for failure to warn.'" First, by permitting plaintiffs to recover against
the manufacturers for their cigarette-induced illnesses, courts can ensure that the sec-
ondary costs of cigarette smoking, that is, medical expenses and disability payments, are
borne by the manufacturer. Next, the imposition of strict liability will force the cigarette
manufacturers to warn adequately of the dangers of smoking. Finally, the fear of addi-
tional tort suits will encourage the cigarette manufacturers to refrain from deceptive
advertising practices.
One of the principal purposes of the imposition of strict liability is to ensure that
the injured party does not bear the cost of injuries caused by a defective product; rather,
the manufacturer who can spread the cost among all consumers by pricing the product
bears the cost. 3 ' 8
 Today the general public, the majority of whom are nonsmokers, bears
the financial burden associated with smoking. The cost of illness and death caused by
cigarette smoking, in terms of medical expense and lost income, is an estimated thirty-
eight billion dollars per year. 319
 Imposition of strict liability upon the cigarette manufac-
turers for failure to warn will shift the economic burden now upon society at large and
plaintiffs in particular to the tobacco industry.'" The cigarette manufacturers, however,
undoubtedly will pass on to the consumer the multi-million dollar judgments or the costs
Professor Donald Garner thoroughly analyses the policy considerations behind cigarette
manufacturer liability. Garner, Welfare Reform, supra note 29, at 270.
315 See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 379, 161 A.2d 69, 81 (1960);
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc, 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63-64, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697,
701 (1963). Professors Montgomery and Owen argue, "ttlhe cost of injuries flowing From typical
risks inherent in products can fairly be put upon the enterprises marketing the products as a cost
of doing business, thus assuring that these enterprises will fully 'pay their own way' in the society
from which they derive their profits." Montgomery and Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Admin-
istration of Strict Tort Liability for Defective Products, 27 S.C.L. REV. 803, 809-10 (1976).
319 130 CONG. REC. sl
 1847 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1984) (13 billion dollars in medical costs and 25
billion dollars in lost economic productivity per year). See generally Garner, Cigarette Dependency,
supra note 29, at 1462-65 (tobacco companies, rather than the general public, should bear the costs
of smoking). Private health insurance bears a large portion of the financial burden associated with
smoking. Federal, state, and local governments also indirectly subsidize the cigarette smoker and
the tobacco industry, through public health facilitiei and care, welfare payments and disability, and
social security benefits. Id. at 1462-63.
320 Cf. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc, 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63-64, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697, 701 (1963), Beshada v Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 205, 447 A.2d 539,
547 (1982).
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of liability insurance. Thus, the smoker, rather than the general public, will bear the cost
of smoking."'
The threat of imposition of strict liability upon the product manufacturer is another
significant policy justification for the imposition of cigarette manufacturer liability. 322
The inadequacy of cigarette warnings, past and present, illustrates the need for strict
liability as a deterrent to the cigarette manufacturers' persistent disregard of their duty
to warn consumers of the health hazards of smoking. To safeguard themselves from
future liability, prudent cigarette manufacturers would employ conspicuous and detailed
health warnings, perhaps comparable to the package inserts found in many consumer
products and medications. Indeed, proponents of tobacco product liability argue that
only a package insert specifically enumerating the risks of smoking and the appearance
of a skull-and-crossbones on the cigarette pack would satisfy the cigarette manufacturer's
duty to warn. 323
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, imposing liability upon the cigarette manu-
facturers would force the manufacturers to change their advertising practices. Cigarette
liability would deter the use of advertising imagery and overpromotion of cigarettes. At
a minimum, manufacturers would have to eliminate advertisements which encourage
the smoker to rationalize or ignore the health hazards of smoking. Liability also would
compel cigarette manufacturers to discontinue their constant reference to the smoking
"controversy," as only the tobacco industry seems to find "controversy" in the docu-
mented medical evidence that smoking is a cause of illness and death.
CoNcLustoN
Cigarettes are responsible for the deaths of over 350,000 Americans each year, yet
the cigarette manufacturers never have been held liable for the illness, suffering and
death that their product causes. Today there are numerous cases pending throughout
the United States seeking to hold cigarette manufacturers strictly liable for failure to
provide adequate warnings of the dangers of smoking. Evolution in the field of products
liability law and substantial evidence linking cigarette smoking to several diseases, in-
" 1 This ignores, however, the cost to society in terms of insurance costs, decreased GNP, and
welfare disbursements. Legislative initative is required to insure that the manufacturer bears the
full cost of cigarette production beyond any damages awarded for failure to warn. Professor Garner
suggests that the government levy a safety tax upon the cigarette manufacturer. Garner, Cigarette
Dependency, supra note 29, at 1464. Under this approach, the government places a heavier tax
burden on the manufacturer of more dangerous cigarettes than on the manufacturer of less
dangerous cigarettes. Garner, Welfare Reform, supra note 29, at 326-27. Garner also advocates civil
adjudication as a method of cost internalization. Id. at 314-26. Under this approach, the government
would grant the various welfare agencies a right to recover from the cigarette manufacturer costs
paid out which are attributable to smoking illness. Id. at 314. Professor Garner recommends a
special administrative tribunal, similar to workmen's compensation boards, as the appropriate fact-
finding mechanism to implement recovery under civil adjudication. Id. at 318-19. Whatever mode
of risk distribution is chosen, it is clear that legislative initiative is necessary to compel the tobacco
industry to internalize the costs of cigarette-induced disease. Given the tremendous power which
the tobacco industry wields in Congress, Congress should organize an impartial task force to devise
an effective risk allocation proposal.
322
	 v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 207, 447 A.2d 539, 548 (1982). See
generally Wade, supra note 13, at 826; Montgomery and Owen, supra note 318, at 828; Cowan, Some
Policy Bases of Product Liability, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1077, 1086-87 (1965).
323 Margolick, supra note 1, at B4, col. 3.
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cluding cancer, heart disease, chronic bronchitis and emphysema, suggest that plaintiffs
in the second generation of cigarette suits should be successful.
Cigarette manufacturers should be held liable for the illness and death their products
cause because they failed to provide timely and adequate warnings of the fatal conse-
quences of smoking. Prior to 1965, the cigarette package contained absolutely no warning
of the hazards of smoking. Because there was an established body of scientific evidence
linking smoking to fatal disease and death long before 1965, the cigarette manufacturers
should be found to have breached their duty to warn. Additionally, the warnings that
the cigarette manufacturers have provided since 1965 have been woefully inadequate to
satisfy the manufacturer's duty to warn. These warnings have not been sufficiently
comprehensive, specific or intense to apprise the consumer fully of the hazards of
smoking. Furthermore, any utility that the Surgeon General's warnings may have had
was negated by the tobacco industry's aggressive marketing efforts and deceptive adver-
tising techniques. In sum, cigarette manufacturer liability for failure to warn is based
upon well-established product liability principles.
Plaintiffs in the second generation of cigarette suits nevertheless will be confronted
with two substantial obstacles to recovery, establishing causation and overcoming the
assumption of the risk defense. These obstacles are by no means insurmountable. The
tremendous wealth of scientific evidence of the health hazards of smoking will be in-
strumental in proving plaintiffs' claim that smoking caused their illness. Furthermore,
the addictive nature of smoking and the ignorance of the majority of the population to
the extent and severity of the hazards of smoking virtually precludes a finding that the
smoker assumed the risk of cigarette-induced disease. In short, no compelling reason
exists to continue to allow the cigarette manufacturers to enjoy immunity from liability
for the harm their product causes. Applying currently accepted product liability stan-
dards, courts should find the cigarette manufacturers strictly liable for failing to provide
timely and adequate warnings of the hazards of cigarette smoking.
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